

Combining stakeholders' strengths in the fight against food insecurity

Public-Private Partnerships as legitimate actors
of Global Governance

Katrien Volleman



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Department of Political Science

Faculty of Social Sciences

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Abstract

Achieving global food security has proven to be remarkably complicated and despite several decades of government and NGO interventions, still many people are facing (chronic) hunger. Recent years have witnessed a growing belief in the potential of collaboration with the private sector, as an alternative, more effective strategy. Consequently, different Public-Private Partnerships for development have been initiated with varying outcomes. This thesis examines three Public-Private Partnerships, all in cooperation with the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that aim to improve food security in fragile states in Africa and compares it to Official Development Assistance, on the basis of their legitimacy.

These PPPs are ‘Increase food security and improve livelihoods of sorghum and rice producers’ involving Heineken and EUCORD in several African countries; ‘Cassava+ ‘Helping farmers produce cassava for profit’ by IFDC and DADTCO in Nigeria, Mozambique and Ghana; and, ‘Smarter Futures – Improving quality wheat and maize flour in Africa’ involving the Food Fortification Initiative, AKZO-Nobel and several NGOs, concentrating on the entire African continent. The former two are concerned with transforming subsistence crops into industrial and economically viable produce, therefore increasing small-holder farmer’s productivity and enlarging the market. The latter intends to increase the nutritional value of already commercialised food, through fortification.

This thesis analyses these PPPs with regard to their activities, internal affairs and their results, based on reports, documents and expert interviews. The findings show the prospects and limitations of PPPs for improving local food security. They illustrate that PPPs do not escape the challenges faced by conventional, government-initiated food security initiatives, but that they could form an effective addition to the traditional ODA system. The conclusions address the effectiveness of involving private actors in achieving food security and the legitimacy of PPPs in comparison with government and NGO initiatives.

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List of abbreviations

AMPU – Autonomous Mobile Processing Unit

CREATE – Community Revenue Enhancement through Agricultural Technology Extension

CSO – Civil Society Organisation

DAC – Development Assistance Committee

DADTCO – Dutch Agricultural Development and Trading Company

DRC – Democratic Republic of Congo

ECOSOC – Economic and Social Council of the United Nations

EUCORD – European Cooperative for Rural Development

FAO – Food and Agricultural Organisation

FFI – Food Fortification Initiative

FORTIMAS – Fortification Monitoring and Surveillance

GAIN – Global Alliance on Improved Nutrition

GAP – Good Agricultural Practices

GDP – Gross Domestic Product

GNI – Gross National Income

HKI – Hellen Keller International

HQCC – High Quality Cassava Cake

IF – International Federation for Spina Bifida and Hydrocephalus

IFAD – International Fund for Agricultural Development

IFDC – International Fertilizer Development Center

IFPRI – International Food Policy Research Institute

IIAM – Mozambique Institute for Agricultural Research

MDGs – Millennium Development Goals

NFA – National Fortification Alliance

NGO – Non-governmental organisation

ODA – Official Development Assistance

OECD – Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

PPP – Public-Private Partnership

UNDP – United Nations Development Programme

WFP – World Food Programme

WSSD – World Summit on Sustainable Development

List of tables

1.1 Definitions of Public-Private Partnerships	10
1.2 Operationalisation of the concept of legitimacy	14
1.3 Operationalisation of the legitimacy indicators	22

List of figures

2.1 Food assistance deliveries to Sub-Saharan Africa (2001-2012)	26
2.2 ODA flows through CSO by type of CSO, 2011	29
2.3 Prevalence of malnutrition and undernourishment in Sub-Saharan Africa (1990-2012)	33
2.4 Domestic food price volatility in Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa (2000-2014)	36
3.1 Status of fortification in Africa in respectively 2008, 2011, 2014	71

Table of contents

Abstract	v
Acknowledgements	vii
List of abbreviations	ix
List of tables	x
List of figures	x
1 Introduction	1
1.1 Background	1
1.2 Research questions	3
1.3 Literature review	4
1.4 Theoretical perspective	15
1.5 Methodology	17
1.6 Outline of the thesis.....	25
2 The current status of food assistance to fragile states in Africa	26
2.1 Input legitimacy of food assistance	27
2.2 Output legitimacy of food assistance	32
2.3 Concluding remarks	37
3 Analysis: legitimacy of three Public-Private Partnerships for food security in Africa	40
3.1. Case studies	41
3.1.1. Increase food security and improve livelihoods of sorghum and rice producers	41
3.1.2. Helping farmers produce cassava for profit	52
3.1.3. Smarter Futures – Improving quality wheat and maize flour in Africa	62
3.2 Concluding remarks	73
4 Conclusion	76
List of References	81
Appendix.....	90

1 Introduction

1.1 Background

With the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) reaching their target date this year, the balance-sheet is being drawn. The first of these Goals, reducing the proportion of undernourished people by half, has almost been reached. Since 1990 the amount of people living in hunger has fallen with 200 million and the percentage of undernourished people decreased from 18.7 to 11.3 worldwide. 63 developing countries have reached MDG 1 and 25 of these have also reached the more stringent World Food Summit Goal to halve the amount of chronically underfed people (FAO, IFAD and WFP, 2014:9). However, despite this positive note, still one in eight people worldwide are undernourished and 805 million people do not have sufficient food to lead a healthy life (United Nations, 2014). The majority of whom live in fragile and conflict-affected states in Sub-Saharan Africa. The region improved little in recent years, maintaining the highest prevalence (percentage of the population) of undernourishment (FAO, IFAD and WFP, 2014:9).

Fragile states are extremely vulnerable to conflict, natural disasters and food price speculations because of their weak institutional capacity. They lack the ability to sufficiently address situations of instability. Therefore, these countries are faced with significantly lower levels of food security than their non-fragile developing counterparts. The percentage of undernourished people in fragile states is, on average, three times as high as in other developing countries and nearly 20% of the world's undernourished people live in fragile states (FAO, IFAD and WFP, 2010:15). Government effectiveness and income are both positively related to hunger and undernourishment (Breisinger et al, 2014:2-3; Alinovi et al, 2007:5). Moreover, the number of years a country suffers from fragility is negatively correlated with the level of food security, indicating that the longer a country is fragile, the more food insecure it will become (FAO, IFAD and WFP, 2010:16). However, fragility does not only affect food security, it also works conversely, therefore “tackling food insecurity and related

problems of agricultural underproduction and resource scarcity can do much to stabilize a fragile situation” (Alinovi et al, 2007:5).

Evidently, food security is extremely difficult to achieve, especially in fragile states. Besides the lack of institutional capacity this is also partly due to the overarching scope of the concept of food security (Breisinger et al, 2014, Ecker and Breisinger, 2012, Yu et al, 2010). The 1996 World Food Summit defined food security as a situation in which “all people, at all times have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life” (World Food Summit, 1996). Alarmed by the still increasing number of malnourished people in the world, this definition got extended during the 2009 World Food Summit. Here, the four pillars of food security got defined: availability of food, physical and economic access to food, utilisation and stability of food over time (World Food Summit, 2009). The importance of this modification is that it called for a comprehensive focus on both the household and national level of food security. This research will focus on food availability, accessibility and stability.

By increasing the provision of food assistance to fragile and conflict affected states in Africa, the international community has shown significant efforts to improve food security in this region. For several decades governments and NGO’s have already actively been providing aid to the continent. Around 30% of total Official Development Assistance (ODA) goes to fragile states (Ishihara, 2012:2). Unfortunately, much of this aid is not used effectively, which results in only 20% of fragile states being well underway to meet the Millennium Development Goals by 2015 (OECD, 2014:17).

Consequently, recent years have witnessed an important change in the system around the provision of Official Development Assistance. In order to improve the effectiveness of development aid cooperation between public and private actors is sought more often. An increasing number of multinational food manufacturers such as Unilever and Nestlé are developing policies to actively partake in improving food security in developing countries (Global Alliance, 2013:9), but also small and medium firms are becoming increasingly involved in these regions. Due to their extensive technological knowledge, financial resources and management skills, businesses are very attractive partners for public actors and NGO’s. Also within the UN apparatus the

value of private actors has been acknowledged and in 2012 UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon launched the UN Zero Hunger Challenge, which calls upon civil society, governments and businesses to join hands in order to eradicate worldwide hunger and malnutrition (United Nations Zero, 2014). Cooperation between these various actors could result in Public Private Partnerships.

The majority of the research on the advantages of Public-Private Partnerships has been empirical and the widely-held notion that there exists no better alternative is therefore not based on the real life experiences. This thesis will therefore aim to aid in filling this gap by evaluating the legitimacy of Public Private Partnerships which aim to improve food security in fragile states in Africa. The outcome will be compared to the legitimacy of the current food assistance system that is provided by means of Official Development Aid.

1.2 Research questions

The above review made clear that there is room for research on the possibilities and potential of public-private partnerships for enhancing food security in fragile states. Consequently, this master thesis will answer the following question:

Are Public-Private Partnerships legitimate tools of global governance to improve food assistance in fragile states compared to Official Development Assistance (ODA)?

In order to provide a comprehensive answer to the research question several sub-questions will be addressed:

- How legitimate is Official Development Assistance of food to fragile states?
- How legitimate are public-private partnerships for food assistance in fragile states?
- Can public-private partnerships be legitimate policy instruments to improve food assistance in fragile states compared to ODA?

Together, these three questions provide a complete picture of the legitimacy of Public-Private Partnerships that aim to improve food security in fragile states. The general claim about PPPs is that they can provide more efficient and legitimate long-term development assistance than the traditional ODA system (Martens, 2007:32-34). In order to analyse whether this claims holds true it is necessary to examine the legitimacy of both methods.

1.3 Literature review

Food assistance and Official Development Assistance (ODA)

Food assistance can generally be divided into three forms, programme food assistance, relief or emergency food assistance and project food assistance (Mousseau, 2005:3-4). Programme food assistance used to be the predominant form of aid. It represents an in-kind form of economic assistance. Contrary to what the term might suggest it is not given freely. Food is produced in the donor country and sold for lower than market prices in the recipient country. Towards the end of the 20th century this form of aid became less popular and got replaced by a focus on emergency food assistance, which is provided for free by the World Food Programme, among others, to countries facing significant threats to their food security.

Project food assistance is similar to emergency food assistance in the sense that it is also provided in form of donations. However, contrary to emergency food assistance, project food assistance has a more sustainable focus, promoting agricultural and economic development in order to improve long-term food security (Mousseau, 2005:3-4). Programme food assistance aims at fostering market development and overall economic growth, while emergency food assistance is crucial in averting temporary situations of food insecurity from turning into a chronic situation (Mousseau, 2005:13). This latter form of aid represented 44% of the total humanitarian emergency assistance spending in 2009 (FAO, IFAD and WFP, 2010:32). The majority of this assistance, approximately 60%, is delivered through multilateral channels. Only 11% is dispersed via bilateral agreements. The remaining 29% is provided for by NGOs (World

Food Programme, 2013:15). The focus of this research will be on project aid, because of its long-term approach, making food security more sustainable, instead of providing emergency relief. Because of these characteristics it is comparable to public-private partnerships, which, by their nature, are long-term projects.

During the 1990s the term food aid gradually became substituted by food assistance, moving towards a policy focussing on “improving access to food, which targets most vulnerable households who face food access deficits; investing livelihoods that targets recovery source of livelihoods and supporting safety nets that targets prevention of loss of livelihoods” (Diriye et al, 2014:397). Parallel with this policy shift, the Official Development Assistance (ODA) to fragile states increased significantly. Between 2000 and 2012 per capita ODA to fragile states grew with 46% compared to 27% in non-fragile countries, resulting in 30% of total ODA being sent to these states in 2010 (OECD, 2013b:43-46). Also the proportion of aid spend on food grew accordingly from one million metric tons on average a year in the 1970s to more than 3.3 million metric tons in the 1990s (Abdulai et al. 2004:17).

Unfortunately, since 2009, we can detect an increasing downward trend in the volume of aid. In 2010, DAC countries disbursed 5% less aid than planned. This decreased even further in 2011 to an 8% decline in aid (OECD, 2012b:5-6). Although, aid to fragile states decreased less significantly, also these countries saw their foreign assistance decline. In 2011 ODA to fragile states decreased by 2.4% compared to the previous year, following a 1% decline between 2009 and 2010 (OECD, 2014:24). Moreover, more than half of ODA to fragile states in 2011 went to just seven recipient countries. Afghanistan and DRC are heading the list. Consequently, the remaining fragile states each received, on average, less than half a percentage of the total ODA (OECD, 2014:27). This downward trend in ODA can be critical to fragile states, since many of them are highly dependent on this source of income. As a matter of fact, for the majority of fragile states ODA forms the largest source of income. In 2011 it varied between roughly 10% of GDP in Guinea-Bissau up to 55% in Tuvalu (OECD, 2014:30).

According to Lentz and Barrett (2005:10) “an individual, household or community exhibits dependency when it cannot meet its immediate basic needs without external assistance”. Aiding these individuals or households to secure their basic needs

is not necessarily undesirable. When welfare enhancing, providing external assistance can certainly be desirable. This is what Lentz and Barrett (2005:10) termed ‘positive dependency’. However, ‘negative dependency’ arises when recipients remain unable to meet their basic needs in the future without external assistance. This is due to the change in behaviour associated with food assistance. Expectations of assistance might for example decrease one’s incentives to provide for one’s own needs. But also policymakers might lack the incentives to invest in agriculture and rural infrastructure (Abdulai et al, 2004:29-30; Barrett, 2006:7). Moreover, in-kind food assistance could further lead to a disruption of the local and domestic food prices. The increase on the supply-side could put a lid on the price fluctuations. Ultimately, this might disrupt the market (Abdulai et al, 2004:22-23; Timmer, 2005:2).

Although much academic literature has focussed on the negative dependency effect of food assistance there are several other negative side-effects critics point out as well, such as a lack of proper timing and targeting of the aid provided. The inertia of the food assistance system often results in late and poorly targeted deliveries. This is because the majority of food assistance is provided for by international organisations such as WFP that need to send their employees from abroad. The food assistance given to Malawi in 2002 after a failed harvest, for example, had taken off too late and as a consequence was still provided a year later during the following harvest (Mousseau, 2005:15). Logistic constraints were the reason for the delay. Not only do logistics make the aid very time-demanding and inflexible, the cost-effectiveness also decreases. For example, during the 2004 tsunami in South-East Asia almost half of the WFP relief budget was spent on logistic expenses (Mousseau, 2005:22).

Emergency food assistance can be crucial in providing access to food and nutrition in dire situations, while programme food assistance could foster market development and overall economic growth (Barrett, 2006:9). However, this only holds when aid is delivered on a short-term basis and when it is well targeted. “When aid becomes persistent and a long-term assistance intervention, there is no doubt that it can create dependence, affect agricultural production and influence market prices, which negatively impact food production resulting in severe food insecurity” (Diriye et al,

2014:398). Overall, these negative effects of food assistance have made critics doubt its effectiveness.

Effectiveness of food assistance in fragile states

In recent years aid effectiveness has become the buzz word in aid circles. In 1996 the OECD/DAC published its report 'Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Cooperation' in which it argued that "development assistance will only work where there is a shared commitment of all the partners" (OECD/DAC, 1996:1). Subsequently, it argued that there is a need for increased coherence and coordination among the donor's policies and activities, as well as more support for "locally owned development strategies" (Development Assistance Committee, 1996:2). This report primarily used a donor-oriented focus. The 1998 World Bank report 'Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn't and Why', on the contrary, had a more proficient recipient-oriented approach to improving aid effectiveness. The report argues that development aid is only effective in countries with a sound policy environment and strong trade and fiscal policies. In countries lacking these policies and institutions aid is wasted. Therefore, in order for aid to be effective it should be combined with the 'right' policies (World Bank: 1998:2-3).

As a result of these reports, as well as the broader focus on aid effectiveness, the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness got created in 2005. It got signed and endorsed by more than a 100 donors and recipient countries. In 2008 this declaration got reaffirmed by the Accra Agenda for Action committing its signatories to adhere to several principles in order to improve aid effectiveness. These principles focussed on country ownership, alignment of donor support with national development strategies, harmonization of donor arrangements and procedures, results-oriented frameworks and mutual accountability for the progress and implementation of the aid which ought to be transparent and predictable (OECD, 2008:3-8). Despite these good intentions, progress has been slow. Only 1 out of the 13 targets set in the Paris Declaration had been met by their due date in 2010 (United Nations System, 2013:20).

Addressing food insecurity and aid effectiveness in fragile states asks for a different approach from the international community than do similar situations in non-fragile countries. The New Deal for engagement in fragile states outlines the shortcomings of development aid to fragile states. First, coordination of the supply of aid is often fragmented, resulting in parallel structures of different aid suppliers. Second, assistance is often short term, which could hamper long-term growth. Finally, there is a lack of comprehensive focus on providing aid and technical assistance as well as long-term state-building and civil service reforms (International Dialogue, 2011:58-63).

Fortunately, the understanding for a more comprehensive approach to aiding fragile states is growing. The FAO outlined this in its annual rapport 'The State of Food Insecurity in the World' by arguing that reducing hunger requires an integrated approach engaging both the public and private sector, as well as civil society (FAO, IFAD and WFP, 2014:39). This call is in line with a general tendency for a broader approach to development aid in order to improve its effectiveness. In 2011 the Busan Partnership Agreement got signed. Recognising the changing character of international development assistance, the agreement calls upon a wide range of actors to cooperate in order to effectively provide development aid, ranging from governments and non-governmental organisations to private firms. It laid the foundation for the Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (OECD, 2012:1-2).

Public-Private Partnerships

Since the 1990s, but especially since the turn of the century, public-private partnerships have gained attention, due to the increasingly globalized world. This hybrid form of governance became part of the UN family in 1992 when the Conference on the Environment and Development (Rio Conference) adopted 'Agenda 21', which stated that "governments, business and industry, including transnational corporations, should strengthen partnerships to implement the principles and criteria for sustainable development" (United Nations, 1992:290). Kofi Annan, supported this development when he stated during his inauguration in 1998 that one of his priorities was to "establish a new partnership for development between the United Nations and the private sector"

(Annan, 1998:135). Matching his words with deeds he announced the establishment of the UN Global Compact in 1999, one of the largest partnerships engaging both the public and private sector in improving and implementing, among others, human rights and environmental policies.

The 2002 Monterrey Conference on Financing for Development set the stage by inviting the private sectors and NGO's to take part in the preparatory phase of the conference. For the first time, private actors were able to take part in negotiations alongside public and civil society actors (Martens, 2007:16). This tendency got continued at the Johannesburg Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), which took place in September of the same year. This summit is remarkable as it concludes more than 200 'Type-2 Outcomes', the so-called partnerships between public, private and other non-state actors (Buckup, 2012:9). As Simon Zadek (2004:21) noted: "the Johannesburg Summit was more than anything about partnerships. Just as Rio was much about legitimising the role of NGOs in global governance as it was about the environment, Johannesburg was about the legitimacy of the role of business in development, working with public bodies and civil society organisations".

In accordance with the growing number of PPPs, the academic literature shifted from predominantly investigating relations among nation states, towards research on transnational partnerships. Especially finding a definition of this new type of governance was of interest to many researchers. Due to the variety of public-private relationships it is widely acknowledged that there is no clear definition on what exactly a PPP encompasses. As Weihe argues, the concept of public-private partnership is ambiguous, "it allows for great variance across parameters such as time, closeness of cooperation, types of products/services, costs, complexity, level of institutionalisation, as well as number of actors involved" (Weihe, 2006:1). The subsequent table outlines several of these definitions.

Table 1.1: Definitions of Public-Private Partnerships
(adapted from Buckup, 2012:26)

Linder and Vaillancourt Rosenau (2000): “[Public-private partnering is] the formation of cooperative relationships between government, profit-making firms, and non-profit private organizations to fulfil a policy function.”

UN (2001, §8): “Partnerships are ... voluntary and collaborative relationships between various parties, both State and non-State actors, in which all participants agree to work together to achieve a common purpose or undertake a specific task and to share risks and responsibilities, resources and benefits.”

WEF (2005b): “[Partnerships] are voluntary collaborations that build on the respective strengths and core competencies of each partner, optimize the allocation of resources and achieve mutually beneficial results over a sustained period. They imply linkages that increase resources, scale and impact.”

Risse and Börzel (2005): “Transnational PPPs would then be institutionalized cooperative relationships between public actors (both governments and international organizations) and private actors beyond the nation–state for governance purposes. By ‘governance purposes,’ we mean the making and implementation of norms and rules for the provision of goods and services that are considered as binding by members of the international community.”

Andonova (2006): “Public–private institutions are voluntary agreements between state and non-state actors that establish a set of norms, rules, practices, or implementation procedures that apply multiple levels of governance.”

Despite this lack of conformity there are some basic aspects of PPPs on which common ground can be found.

- Partnerships are created to provide a public good (Buckup, 2012; Schäferhoff et al, 2009; Homkes, 2011; Risse and Börzel, 2005). A public good is defined as a good “with nonexclusive benefits and non-rival consumption” (Schäferhoff et al, 2009:454).
- Partnerships employ voluntary and hierarchical modes of governance (Risse and Börzel, 2005; Homkes, 2011). This is what sets PPPs apart from other modes of governance as it does not set rules or laws and the actors are involved in the partnerships on a voluntary basis (Andonova, 2006:2).

- Partnerships are multi-stakeholder institutions (Buckup, 2012; Homkes, 2011). Although, all definitions agree on this characteristics, one strand of the literature argues that at least one stakeholder is required to be a public actor and one a private organisation. The partnerships in this group are often termed ‘public-private partnerships’ (Andonova, 2006; Risse and Börzel, 2005, Schäferhoff et al, 2009). The other strand does not make such a requirement. According to its supporters, a partnership can involve any stakeholder in civil society, no matter whether private or public. These partnerships are known as ‘multi-stakeholder partnerships’ (Zadek, 2005).
- Partnerships are always either institutions or organisations. Some argue that partnerships are official organisations with its stakeholders as partly independent actors (Pattberg and Dingwerth, 2006). Others view PPPs as institutions in which the focus lies on the interaction between the stakeholders (Andonova, 2006; Schäferhoff et al, 2009).
- Finally, partnerships are global relationships. Public-private partnerships are global in the sense that they constitute partners from distinct countries and backgrounds. However, this does not imply that the stakeholders themselves need to be represented globally (Buckup, 2012; Andonova, 2006; Schäferhoff, 2009).

Based on the above literature review a public-private partnership in this research will be defined as *‘a voluntary, institutional and transnational relationship between several actors of which at least one is public and one private who jointly commit to invest resources in the provision of a global public good’*.

Debating partnerships

Despite the growing promotion of PPPs as unique structures to address today’s global challenges, they are far from a proven mode of governance. The general believe about public-private partnerships is that they will improve the legitimacy and problem-solving capacity of international governance structures, because they combine the various strengths of their stakeholders (Rosenau, 1999:10-11; Martens, 2007:32; Börzel

and Risse, 2002:14-15). The neo-liberal argument in support of PPPs argues that the private sector provides technical knowledge, efficiency and entrepreneurial expertise that the public sector and civil society are lacking. Another strand of proponents argue that the involvement of non-governmental and not-for-profit organisations to the partnerships is crucial as well, since these actors will increase the democratic nature and accountability of the partnership (Börzel and Risse, 2002:14). Combining the strengths of these varying actors will improve the effectiveness, legitimacy, and the accountability of the international governance institutions (Börzel and Risse, 2002:1; Bäckstrand, 2006:291).

On the basis of these stands, the advantages of PPPs are summarized using three deficits in the traditional intergovernmental system providing development aid that PPPs are expected to fill (Bierman et al 2007; Martens, 2007; Bäckstrand, 2006). This thesis will examine whether this is the case. The following deficits will be assessed:

- Regulatory or governance deficit. Partnerships are expected to provide avenues for global issues to which the solution is now hampered due to the existing intergovernmental system. The traditional governance system is hindered by differing governmental interests and lacking capacity and competence. Partnerships are thought to step in where governments fail.
- Participation deficit. Participation in governance is one of the main aspects of democracy. Unfortunately, in the intergovernmental system many non-state actors are excluded from governance. Partnerships are supposed to bridge this gap, by including these actors in the negotiation and decision-making process. Moreover, by their consensus based approach they reduce the costs of compliance to international agreements.
- Implementation deficit. Governments often fail to implement policies made at the international level because of a lack of knowledge, financial means, or sometimes political will. This is the case with environmental policies, such as the Copenhagen agreement. The idea is to include non-state actors as they can mobilise funds and are thought to better strive for implementation of particular policies (Bierman et al 2007:8; Martens, 2007:33; Bäckstrand, 2006:303).

Despite this positive note, there are several significant remarks to be made. Critics point out that partnerships do not necessarily fill these deficits (Bierman et al, 2007; Martens 2007, Rosenau Vaillancourt, 1999). How can partnerships be accountable if the actors themselves are unaccountable? Moreover, partnerships often claim to aid in filling the participation deficit, but who is responsible for selecting the partners? Often, various stakeholders themselves decide to form a partnership, which generally makes them exclusive, decreasing the representativeness and thus the legitimacy (Martens, 2007:39). Also the effectiveness of PPPs is criticised on lacking the acclaimed problem-solving capacity. The provision of public goods get shifted from the public sector to non-state actors, in which the former depends on the latter for financial resources and technical expertise. This shift of authority could easily result in problem-shifting instead of problem-solving. Revoking the delegation is not an option, since the functions were delegated to non-state actors, because the public authority was unable of properly provide them in the first place (Börzel and Risse, 2002:15). Besides, bringing those actors to the table who are burdened by implementing the policies might result in lowest common denominator solutions. Compromises might lead to the watering down of regulations. Also the implementation gap would therefore not necessarily be filled.

Input and output legitimacy

As explained in the previous section proponents of PPPs expect this form of governance to improve the legitimacy and effectiveness of aid. In a democratic system a regime is legitimate, because citizens hold their rulers accountable for their actions by participating in the decision-making process through representation and voting. Beyond the nation-state, this mechanism of accountability is mostly absent. Consequently, global governance systems could face legitimacy problems (Risse, 2004:6-7). Instead of focussing on the independent actors, legitimacy refers to the general democratic quality of the political and social order; its institutions, rules and norms (Bäckstrand 2006; Risse, 2004; Kylsäter, 2011; Schäferhoff et al 2009; Schouten, 2013). This research will use a normative approach to legitimacy in which the concept concerns both input and

output legitimacy. Input legitimacy refers to the “participatory quality of the decision-making process” (Bäckstrand, 2006:294). This includes the transparency, representation and accountability of the partnership. Output legitimacy, on the other hand, concerns the problem-solving capacities and goal-rationality of the partnerships. It refers to its effectiveness. Based on this normative approach there are six attributes of legitimacy that will be studied.

Table 1.2: Operationalisation of the concept of legitimacy
(adapted from Kylsäter, 2011:55)

Value	Operationalisation
1. Representativeness	What groups and kind of actors are represented in the PPP? Do we find governments, IOs, NGOs, business etc. as members of the PPP?
2. Inclusion	To what extent can different actors participate in the decision-making process of the PPP? Are all the members included in the same way, or do we find imbalances?
3. Transparency	Does the PPP seem to have an open decision-making process and organisational structure? Is it easy for outsiders to find information about what the PPP is working with?
4. Deliberation	What room does the PPP have for debates in its activities? Can it be seen to increase the deliberation within its policy area?
5. Goal rationality	Are the PPP's activities coherent with its goals and are these rational to achieve? Or is the PPP working with several different things that only vaguely lead towards its goals?
6. Effectiveness	What regulations and programmes has the PPP created to implement its policy? Do the stakeholders and subjects to this policy comply with it? Does this policy and the actions taken by the PPP actually lead to solving the problem at hand?

The first four values, representativeness, inclusion, transparency and deliberation, account for input legitimacy, as these are concerned with the policy-making process. The latter two, effectiveness and goal orientation will measure output legitimacy, since they are related to the policy outcome.

Some authors argue that input and output legitimacy are mutually exclusive. In this respect, high output legitimacy could compensate for low input legitimacy. Vice versa, a lack of effectiveness asks for increased input legitimacy in terms of transparent and accountable decision-making processes (Bäckstrand, 2006:294). Börzel and Risse (2002:18), on the other hand, argue that a trade-off between input and output legitimacy might arise. More inclusive PPPs might have to give in on effectiveness, since there are many stakeholders that want to influence the policy. However, the more exclusive a partnership becomes the less accountable and transparent, decreasing in legitimacy. This thesis will examine whether this argument holds true or whether partnerships can be both inclusive and effective.

1.4 Theoretical perspective

International organisations and multilateral companies, global issues such as climate change and the economic crisis, and trans-border structures like financial flows are all a result of globalization. Because of this process non-state actors such as NGO's and private entities have increasingly gained power affecting the traditional Westphalian system which was centred around the nation state. In the words of Jan Aart Scholte (2005:186) "regulatory operations of territorial bureaucratic national governments, also called 'statism', are no longer viable and are being replaced by polycentrism". Consequently, states are faced with a loss of sovereignty. Laws and regulations are not applicable in the same way on an international level as they are in the national sphere. Supranational organisations, such as the EU, have gained power to develop their own regulatory system to which member states need to abide. However, globalization does not necessarily reduce the role of nation states, it redefines it based on changing pressures and actors on the national and international level (Baer, 2011:20). Consequently, governance can no longer be viewed as solely exercised by governments.

As Rosenau (1995:13) mentioned “governance is conceived to include systems of rule at all levels of human activity – from the family to the international organisations – in which the pursuit of goals through the exercise of control has transnational repercussions”.

This very broad definition has been widely criticised and debated. In the words of Finkelstein (1995:368) “Global Governance appears to be virtually anything” pointing towards the lack of consensus on its meaning. These varying ideas derive mostly from disagreement on the meaning of governance. “Many academics and international practitioners employ governance to connote a complex set of structures and processes, both public and private, while more popular writers tend to use it synonymously with government” (Weiss, 2000:795). Stoker then argues that “there is, however, a baseline agreement that governance refers to the development of governing styles in which boundaries between and within public and private sectors have become blurred. The essence of governance is its focus on governing mechanisms which do not rest on recourse to the authority and sanctions of government” (Stoker, 1998:17). In this sense, one could speak of governance as a narrower definition of government focussing on cooperation between the state and non-state actors.

Pattberg and Dingwerth (2006:189) make a distinction between an analytical – “the actual, perceived, or constructed reality of contemporary world politics” – and a normative usage of the term Global Governance, indicating the way international political institutions should address pressing global issues. This thesis will focus on the analytical use of the term. According to this point of departure, Global Governance can be traced to the growing dissatisfaction of international relations’ students with the existing theories. The dominant theories of realism and neo-liberal could no longer capture the changing international landscape which centred around the nation-state (Baer, 2011:13). According to the analytical perspective on Global Governance there are four aspects in which this new discipline differs from the more traditional ones.

First, Global Governance does not revolve around “politics among nations”, but instead views non-governmental organisations and private actors, among others, as equally important (Pattberg and Dingwerth, 2006:191). There is no hierarchy in the international system. Second, while other theories of international relations regard

international interaction as distinct from interaction at other levels, Global Governance, in contrast, views world politics as a multilevel system in which local, national and global interaction are linked. Third, international relations theories focus on power, security and interstate bargaining. Global Governance in contrast, argues that many forms of governance exist alongside one another without hierarchy. There exists no single organising principle. Fourth, while international relations tend to focus on authority, legitimacy and a state's ability to pursue its self-interest, global governance includes the emergence of new spheres of authority in the international landscape apart from nation states (Pattberg and Dingwerth, 2006:191-193). An example of such new authority would be private firms that regulate whole market segments. Public-Private Partnerships perfectly fit this theory, as they are transnational institutions combining actors from different backgrounds which work together at various levels lacking a clear hierarchy.

1.5 Methodology

This section outlines the methodological reasoning behind the approach used in this study. First, the design of the research will be explained, followed by the sampling strategy. The way the data are collected and analysed will then be discussed, concluding with the methodological challenges.

Research design

In order to properly answer the research question a qualitative study will be conducted. The research question asks for a deeper understanding of the perception of Public-Private Partnerships as being legitimate. Relatively little academic research has been done on the legitimacy of Public-Private Partnerships. Moreover, legitimacy is not a static concept, but can rather be classified as a relative notion about which “there are no universally shared criteria” (Koppell, 2008:192). Consequently, this research is of an exploratory and interpretative nature using a qualitative approach in order to best tackle and incorporate these perceptions and opinions. A quantitative method would not be

suitable here as it looks for relations between concepts, but leaves out the explanations or mechanisms that are the cause of these relations (Boeije, 2014:32).

A document study will then be applied and combined with a case study analysis. According to Altheide (1996:2) a document study is “an integrated and conceptually informed method procedure and technique for locating, identifying, retrieving and analysing documents for their relevance, significance and meaning”. A document analysis is helpful for gaining an understanding of, and demarcating the theory that will be used in the research. It allows the researcher to give direction to the study (Boeije, 2014:61) Relevant articles will be selected, while omitting others. This approach is used when writing the theoretical background. However, in order to compare the legitimacy of Public-Private Partnerships to the current system of food assistance, an analysis of the latter ought to be made. This will also be done using document analysis by examining documents from the FAO, WFP, IFPRI and the OECD. These would primarily concern reports involving statistical data and theories about the state of affairs of food assistance to Africa.

Three case studies have further been selected to obtain a detailed picture of the legitimacy of Public-Private Partnerships that aim to improve food security. The use of case studies here fits the exploratory nature of the research, since a case study provides in-depth information about a particular case (within-case study) in which the hypotheses generated by the literature can be tested. The internal validity of the research will therefore be significant. However, due to this in-depth approach possible new hypotheses can be generated as well (Gerring, 2007:39-43). Since not one single case, but three distinct cases are being studied in this research it is also possible to compare the characteristics of each of them, resulting in cross-case variation and allowing for hypothesis testing.

Sampling strategy

The cases have been selected using document analysis, which allowed for purposive sampling of the three Public-Private Partnerships. Based on the literature and theory on PPPs and legitimacy three cases have been chosen in order to allow for

maximum variation. The cases were selected based on their partners, geographical area, number of years active, their budget and their ranking on the Fragile States Index. A focus on PPPs in Africa has been chosen because African countries score highest on average in every single of the fragility indexes evaluated. Moreover, as indicated in the 2014 report 'Building Resilience for Food and Nutrition Security' published by IFPRI 23 out of the 27 countries most vulnerable to food insecurity are located in Africa (Barrett and Headey, 2014:18). A clear business-driven case was selected, one which is led by NGO's primarily aimed at lobbying, and one which has encountered some start-up difficulties. Proponents of quantitative analysis argue that this sampling method results in low external validity, because the cases are not selected at random and thus lack representativeness (Gerring, 2007:43). However, by electing those cases that allow for variation in characteristics that would also appear in the population under investigation, it is possible to allow for inductive generalisation (Boeije, 2014:66).

In selecting the case studies, also their ranking on the Fragile States Index has been taken into account. This index categorises countries in 11 categories based on their level of fragility ranging from 'very high alert', including South Sudan and Somalia among others, to 'very sustainable', which is only made up of Finland (Haken et al, 2014:4-5). The projects selected for this research are initiated in countries characterized by an 'alert' or 'very high warning' level of fragility. The Fund for Peace' Fragile States Index was selected for this research using the UNDP's Users' Guide on Measuring Fragility (2009). This guide examines and compares the indices based on conceptual analysis. After comparing 11 fragility indices the Fragile States Index appeared most suitable for this research, based on its coverage, use of indicators to cover state fragility, methodology and the readability of the indices.

In order to obtain a picture of each of the partnerships that is as broad and detailed as possible, partners from all three sectors were interviewed; i.e. a representative of the public sector entity, one from the private sector partner and one from the civil society organisation(s) involved, resulting in a total of 9 interviews. As a result of their background each of these partners provided a different point of view on the partnership, together making up a picture resembling reality. The interviewees were selected using the snowball method (Boeije, 2014:69). Using previous contacts at the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs the contact information from the other partners got obtained as well. The partners were first approached via an e-mail containing a formal letter with information about the research and the content of the interview, as well as the way the information would be dealt with. To none it was a problem to record the interview, nor to use their (organisation's) names in the research paper.

Data collection

A minority of the data will be obtained assessing progress reports and related documents from the partners. The majority of the information is obtained through face-to-face interviews with representatives of the partners who are highly involved in the projects. This will be done in order to get an all-encompassing vision of the projects, because the partners might have different incentives and stakes. Experts interviews are conducted with persons who have proficient knowledge about the topic at hand and have in depth insight in the ins and outs of the organisation or project (Baer, 2011:102). "One of the most important functions of an elite interview is to try to assist the political scientist in understanding the theoretical position/s of the interviewee; his/her perceptions, belief and ideologies. Such information can rarely be gleaned from examining books, documents or records. By their very nature, elite interviews provide a subjective account for an event or issue" (Richards, 1996:199-200). This research method is therefore especially useful concerning issues about which is relatively little known, which is the case in this research on PPPs, since there is no academic knowledge yet about the legitimacy of the projects under examination.

In general interviews allow the interviewee to elaborate on their answer. Semi-structured interviews make it possible to deviate from the prepared questions and adapt to the specific project as well as the conversation. This particular method of interviewing has been chosen, because it makes it possible to compare the interview outcomes, as well as to categorise the answers (Baer, 2011:103). Consequently, it will be possible to look for common as well as divergent characteristics among the PPPs, which is necessary in order to draw conclusions on their legitimacy.

Data analysis

Each of the cases will be evaluated based on its input and output legitimacy, as has been done as well to analyse the current system of food aid. Consequently, it will be possible to compare the three partnerships under study to the traditional system of food assistance. In both the traditional system as well as the case studies, legitimacy will be operationalised based on the six attributes outlined in Table 1.2. Each attribute indicates a particular aspect of legitimacy. The advantages of using this analytical framework of legitimacy and effectiveness is that it operationalizes the concepts, structuring the research. Moreover, it also provides a broad and all-encompassing approach to the values of “good governance”, which can be applied in various contexts. It allows for diversion of the state-centric approach that is often used for understanding the concept of legitimacy and regime effectiveness. A necessary and sufficient approach will be used to assess the PPPs’ level of legitimacy. This means that all attributes of the concept need to be present in order to constitute it (Gerring 2007:126-128). A high level of transparency, for example could therefore not compensate for a low level of inclusion.

In order to properly assess these attributes a value between 1 and 5 will be assigned to each of them based on the extent to which the attribute is present. An ordinal measurement scale will be used, which includes the following categories.

- 1. = absence
- 2. = low presence
- 3. = medium presence
- 4. = high presence
- 5. = very high presence

For example, in case a PPP scores 2 on representativeness, the extent to which all the parties affected by the PPP are represented in the partnerships is fairly low. This mode of measurement allows for cross-case comparison of the attributes.

Table 1.3: Operationalisation of the legitimacy indicators

	Score = 1	Score = 2	Score = 3	Score = 4	Score = 5
Representativeness	Only one private and one public actor are represented in the PPP.	Only one private, one public and one civil society actor are represented in the PPP.	At least one private, one public and one civil society actor are represented in the PPP, however, the majority comes from the developed region.	At least two private, two public and two civil society actors are represented in the PPP, however they are not equally divided between the developed and developing region.	Actors from the public and private arena and civil society from both the developed and developing region are equally represented in the PPP.
Inclusion	Only one private and one public actor are included in the decision-making process.	Only one private, one public and one civil society actor are included in the decision-making process.	At least one private, one public and one civil society actor are included in the decision-making process, however, the majority comes from the developed region.	At least two private, two public and two civil society actors are included in the decision-making process, however they are not equally divided between the developed and developing region.	Actors from the public and private arena and civil society from both the developed and developing region are included in the decision-making process.
Transparency	The internal state of affairs, the decision-making and evaluation process of the PPP are not open and	A minority of the partners have limited insight into the internal state of affairs, the decision-making and evaluation	Half of the partners have reasonable insight into the internal state of affairs, the decision-making and evaluation	Most partners have insight into the majority of the internal state of affairs, the decision-making and evaluation	All information regarding the internal state of affairs, the decision-making and evaluation process of the PPP is available

	accessible to the partners.	process of the PPP and this is difficult to access.	process of the PPP and this is difficult to access.	process of the PPP and this is easily accessible.	and easily accessible for all partners.
Deliberation	There is no deliberation between the actors involved in the PPP about its state of affairs.	Deliberation between one private and one public/civil society partner from the developed region occurs, but not on all relevant issues.	Actors from both the public and private arena and civil society are involved in the deliberation process, however there is no proper communication between the partners from the developing and developed region.	Actors from both the public and private arena and civil society from the developed and developing region are involved in the deliberation process, however deliberation does not occur on all relevant issues.	Actors from the public and private arena and civil society from both the developed and developing region are involved in systematically recurring deliberation on all relevant issues.
Goal rationality	The PPP does not have clearly indicated goals.	The PPP has indicated its goals but the means are lacking.	The PPP has indicated its goals and the means are identified, but they lack coherency.	The PPP has indicated its goals and the means are identified, but only some are coherent, others are not.	The PPP's goals are clearly indicated, the means are identified and coherent with the goals.
Effectiveness	The PPP has not achieved any of its goals.	The PPP has only achieved less than half of its goals.	The PPP has achieved half of its goals.	The PPP has achieved all of its goals.	The PPP has achieved all of its goals and several unforeseen, positive side effects occurred.

Subsequently, the interviews will be analysed using textual analysis. This research method argues that texts should be used as sources for investigation. Language is not an objective reflection of reality, but it does indicate the perceptions and views one has about it. Therefore, textual analysis is argued to be a useful method to analyse the presence of varying ideas and principles on a particular topic (APSA: Qualitative Methods, 2004; McKee, 2003). It will allow for comparison of the partners' perceptions of the PPP under study. Discourse analysis, as a subversion of textual analysis, will be applied in order to examine the interpretation of words in their context (APSA: Qualitative Methods, 2004). Qualitative data analysis software MAXQDA will be used to examine the interviews. Afterwards, the analysis will be sent to the interviewees for an evaluation of accuracy of the content.

Methodological challenges

The primary methodological challenge this research faces is that it compares the complete ODA system with merely three case of Public-Private Partnerships. This could result in a skewed comparison. However, the reason for this comparison is that a general overview of the legitimacy of PPPs for improving food security does not yet exist. Moreover, PPPs claim to be more efficient and effective than ODA in general, not merely than particular ODA projects. This is the reason why the three case studies will not be compared to three cases of ODA projects, because PPP do not only claim to be more legitimate than particular project, but they argue to be able to provide more effective and sustainable aid in general. Besides, also because of practical constraints, this comparison will not be made, as Public-Private Partnerships are created in those particular places where ODA projects do not develop effectively. Comparing a PPP with an ODA project in the same circumstances, is therefore practically very difficult.


1.6 Outline of the thesis

As this research will compare the traditional ODA system with three cases of Public-Private Partnerships based on their legitimacy, both systems' legitimacy will be examined. Using the indicators outlined above, the traditional ODA system will be assessed on its input and output legitimacy. This section will therefore answer the sub-question as to how legitimate Official Development Assistance of food assistance in fragile states, actually is? Subsequently, the same assessment will be conducted concerning the three case studies. An overview of each of the PPPs will be provided, followed by an examination of their legitimacy, answering the second sub-question. This assessment makes it possible to draw conclusions on the requirements for a successful Public-Private Partnership. Finally, on the basis of these two assessment a comparison will be made between the two, answering the research question, whether public-private partnerships are legitimate policy instruments to improve food assistance in fragile states compared to ODA?

2 The current status of food assistance to fragile states in Africa

As indicated in the graph underneath, food assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa largely exists of emergency food assistance. This is partly due to the high prevalence of fragile and emergency situations, caused by war and natural disasters among others, that the region is facing, but also because some countries that face chronic food insecurity now permanently receive this form of aid. Programme food assistance, as explained before, has largely been replaced by project food assistance. In contrast to emergency food assistance, this latter, more sustainable form of aid has remained stable and even increased slightly since the start of the economic crisis in 2008, indicating the shifting focus on durable improvements in food security (World Food Programme, 2015). Moreover, in 2012 the majority of project food aid (66%) was delivered to Sub-Saharan Africa (World Food Programme, 2013:25).

Figure 2.1: Food aid deliveries to Sub-Saharan Africa (2001-2012)
(Adopted from World Food Programme, 2013)



As there are no indications that there will be differences in the legitimacy indicators of project aid compared to overall development assistance, the legitimacy of food assistance in general will be assessed here. Moreover, solely examining project aid could result in including coincidences in the analysis, as there is no general picture of the legitimacy of project aid yet.

2.1 Input legitimacy of food assistance


Have these food assistance flows been legitimate? In order to assess and compare the traditional food assistance system with the PPPs in the case studies it will be examined on the basis of the legitimacy indicators outlined above. The traditional ODA system, especially when multilateral, scores relatively well on representativeness and inclusion. By their nature, multilateral organisations are formed between several nations and or organisations, thus governments and NGOs from both donor and recipient countries are involved in the provision of aid, as well as the decision-making process (Klingebiel, 2013:5). Unfortunately, there are some critical points to be raised concerning these positive levels of representativeness and inclusion of the ODA system. By definition, national governments are representative, provided that they are elected through fair and free elections by their constituents (Bevir, 2007: 828). In developing countries, elections might not always be free and fair, resulting in a government which does not fully represent its constituency. This might affect the representativeness and inclusion of the aid provision system, as the target group might not be properly represented in the multilateral organisation.

Representativeness is also affected due to a decrease in the public support for ODA in donor countries. As a result of the increasing scrutiny of the effectiveness of aid, tax payers in donor countries started doubting ODA's legitimacy. They wished to be informed about the allocation of their money in order to be certain that it was not misappropriated or wasted. The economic crisis has only further strengthened this critical public opinion. As tax payers suffered budgetary cuts in their own country they grew reluctant to uphold the 0.7% ODA/GNI commitment (Herfkens, 2011:15-16). Consequently, the representativeness and inclusion of the tax payers concerning the

allocation of development aid was negatively affected. A third point critics often raise is that donor countries could use development aid as a foreign-policy mechanism. Because these countries are able to provide more financial means they often have a larger say in the decision-making process in multilateral organisations. This tendency is even more present in bilateral aid. As many of the receiving countries are dependent on development aid, the donor country could use the allocation of the aid to its own benefit and enhance its own interests (Klingebiel, 2013:5).

A final point of critique to be noted is that, although multilateral organisations engage various actors that are involved in, or influenced by, the provision of the aid, developing country-based civil society organisations (CSOs) are often not incorporated in the organisation and decision-making process. As indicated in the following graph, DAC members clearly prefer to fund donor country-based CSOs over other types of CSOs. In 2011, even ten times as much aid was funded through donor country-based CSOs than through developing country-based CSOs (OECD, 2013:8). This trend is consistent with NGOs active in the provision of food assistance. CARE, Catholic Relief Service and World Vision, the largest CSO providers of food assistance, are all based in the developed world. Consequently, this negatively affects the representativeness and inclusion of the target groups, since local civil society organisations usually have in depth knowledge about the local or national situation, where the assistance will be provided. They contribute “a first step towards a more complete answer to the intermediation problem between donors and recipients” (Martens, 2004:10).

Figure 2.2: ODA flows through CSO by type of CSO, 2011
(Adopted from OECD, 2013: 8)



Since recent years transparency in the ODA system has been high on the global, political agenda. During the 2011 Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation the stakeholders involved committed to improving the availability and accessibility of information regarding development cooperation. By the end of 2015 “a common standard for the electronic publication of data on development cooperation” is ought to be in place (OECD, 2012:2). In line with these international developments the World Food Programme initiated monthly publication of expenditure information regarding approximately 600 projects in over 90 countries. Moreover, since 2013 the organisation also started publishing estimated budgets and forward looking project information for the following years (International Aid Transparency, 2014:144-145).

The urge to push for these common standards was caused by the increasing opacity that characterises the ODA system. This was partly caused by the high level of fragmentation in the system. According to the OECD, “fragmentation occurs when there are too many donors giving too little aid to too many countries” (OECD, 2015). The results of this can severely affect the effectiveness of aid, but can also increase transaction costs and lead to unnecessary bureaucratic trouble, because many different

donors, all with their own working modes and processes, are active in overlapping themes and regions. This is clearly indicated in Sub-Saharan Africa where the aid relationships quadrupled between 2000 and 2010. Unfortunately, only 60% of these were significant relationships (OECD, 2013c:30).

Despite these efforts, transparency in the ODA system remains difficult to achieve. Currently, there are approximately 233 official multilateral aid organisations and between 6,000 and 30,000 NGOs active in developing countries, all of which work in (partly) overlapping fields. Bilateral aid and private organisations are yet to be added to these numbers and new players, such as China and Turkey, have entered the playing field as well (Kharas, 2007:15-16). Coordination of the aid thus remains extremely difficult, also because many of the new actors are no signatories to the Busan Partnership. Transparency is therefore a critical point for ODA.

Fortunately, the ODA system providing food assistance is somewhat more transparent, since the large majority (99%) of multilateral food assistance is channelled through the WFP and the largest NGOs World Vision, CARE and Catholic Relief Service, who channel the largest share of food assistance to NGOs, work closely together with WFP (Mousseau, 2005: 20). Despite this relatively clear landscape of food aid organisations there are many small NGOs working outside of the scope of the WFP. Moreover, there is also a growing number of non-DAC members, such as India and China that are providing an increasing amount of bilateral food assistance (Harvey et al, 2010:15-16).

These critical points raised concerning representativeness, inclusion and transparency could also affect the level of deliberation in the system. High levels of inclusion and transparency could foster the deliberation process. Representation and involvement in the decision-making process and transparency into the internal affairs of the organisation are required in order for deliberation to take place. Deliberation involves exchanging information and opinions, increasing mutual understanding and therefore improving effective problem-solving (Verweij en Josling, 2003:10). When food aid is delivered through multilateral organisations, in theory, deliberation should take place, because these organisations provide forums where national governments and

NGOs can debate their stand on their shared interest, in this case the provision of food aid.

Unfortunately, in practise, many multilateral institutions face skewed power relations, where certain national governments, which can provide for much of the financial means, will control the discussions and decision-making process (Keohane et al, 2009:23-24). It should be noted however, that it is difficult to assess to what extent deliberation processes are influenced by these skewed relations, all the more because there is little public information about the internal debates and consultation, which often also take place in an informal manner. The WFP's Executive Board, for example, exists of 36 members who meet on a monthly basis. These members have been selected for a three-year term by ECOSOC together with the FAO (World Food Programme, 2014:7). However, little is known about the consultation of the other members outside the board, for example. Nonetheless, both organisations are actively working towards increasing consultation and deliberation with other actors in the field. The three UN organisations involved in food aid, for example, the FAO, IFAD and WFP, have improved their communication and deliberation over recent years. The heads of the organisations meet at least once a month in order to coordinate their efforts (Zwieten van, 2013:10).

A final point of critique at the address of development organisations is that food assistance undermines the legitimacy of the recipient country's government, because providing food is a public service that ought to be provided for by the national government, instead of international actors. According to the theory on the social contract between a state's government and its constituency, the government is expected to provide public services in exchange for tax payment and political support. As donors have increasingly emphasised their role in the provision of the aid, this trade between the public and the government could be affected. Citizens lose confidence in the abilities of their government, which could result in a decrease of tax income and general compliance of the constituency (Dietrich and Winters, 2015:1, 7).

2.2 Output legitimacy of food assistance

Also the output legitimacy of the food assistance system has been highly criticised. The goal rationality of the largest organisations providing food assistance is accounted for. The WFP's mandate states that the organisation has a double aim providing food assistance in emergency situations, as well as support for economic and social development, aiding to improve food security (Zwieten van, 2013:4). The FAO's overall aim is similar to the WFP's, except that the FAO has a more long-term focus, intending to improve food security through development of the agricultural sector and rural communities, eventually "contributing towards an expanding world economy" (Food and Agricultural, 2013:3). It should be noted that these are long-term goals, to be met in many different regions, under varying circumstances, which makes it difficult to specify. Nonetheless, it is clear where both organisations work towards, and on that basis have indicated their means to achieve this.


In contrast to goal rationality ODA's level of effectiveness is less clear and therefore highly criticised. As outlined before, since the end of the 1990s much effort has been made to improve the effectiveness of food assistance or ODA in general. The World Bank defines aid effectiveness as: "the impact that aid has in reducing poverty and inequality, increasing growth, building capacity, and accelerating achievement of the Millennium Development Goals set by the international community"¹ (World Bank, 2015). Based on this definition measuring the effectiveness of the food assistance system would then require to examine the impact of food assistance in reducing food insecurity and speeding up the achievement of MDG 1.

As pointed out before, the goal to reduce hunger by half has almost been reached on a global scale and MDG1 has thus almost been achieved. Unfortunately, these numbers do not necessarily hold true for Sub-Saharan Africa. As pointed out in the graph below, the prevalence of both malnutrition and undernourishment as a percentage of the population have both been steadily decreasing in Sub-Saharan Africa. However,

¹ This definition has been compared to several others, most notably to those of the OECD and the FAO. The definition provided by the World Bank has been selected however, because its practical possibilities to be operationalized, as well as its reference to the Millennium Development Goals, which are currently high on the development agenda.

malnutrition only decreased from 29% in 1990 to 21% 2013 and also undernourishment only decreased with 7.5% instead of the expected 15% (World DataBank, 2015). Consequently, the progress in achieving MDG 1 in Sub-Saharan Africa does not run parallel with the global development. This supports the literature which states that the overall development of food security has been significantly lower in Sub-Saharan Africa where the majority of states are classified as fragile, compared to non-fragile developing countries (Alinovi et al, 2007; Breisinger et al, 2014; Brinkman & Hendrix, 2011; Ishihara, 2012).

**Figure 3.3: Prevalence of malnutrition and undernourishment in
Sub-Saharan Africa (1990-2012)**
(Adapted from World DataBank, 2015)



Although malnutrition and undernourishment are important factors indicating the level of food security, the multifaceted nature of the concept of food security asks for a more in depth approach. Food security is too complex a concept to be measured by two indicators. Therefore, in order to test the effectiveness of food assistance, the progress that has been made in improving food security as a whole in Africa will also be assessed on the basis of the four indicators of food security, namely availability, accessibility, utilization and stability. Each of these indicators has several attributes which together provide a thorough assessment of the indicator's progress.

Food availability is measured by, among others, the value of the food production per capita, the average protein supply and the dietary energy supply adequacy. This latter factor “expresses the dietary energy supply as a percentage of the average dietary energy requirement” (Food and Agricultural, 2013b:76). This number has been increasing significantly throughout the previous two decades. 1992 was taken as reference point after which the value increased to 110% since 2011, indicating that since 1992 the ability to meet the average dietary energy requirement by the supply has increased by 10% (FAOSTAT, 2015). Also the average value of food production has slowly been increasing, both in Africa as well as Sub-Saharan Africa, more specifically. This factor is an indicator for the economic size of the food production sector in the region. Again, there exists a clear difference between Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. While the value of the food production increased with 15% in Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa only experienced a 7.3% growth (FAOSTAT, 2015). Finally, also the average protein supply has slowly increased throughout recent years from 52 gram per capita per day in 1990 to 58 gram per capita per day in 2011. Unfortunately, as to a global increase of 13%, Africa is lagging behind compared to other regions (FAOSTAT, 2015).


Stability of food is and food prices is a second, and very important indicator of food security, that has been highly volatile during recent years. Price swings and shortfall in the food supply could have harmful effects on national and household level food security. On the demand side, households are forced to adjust their immediate food intake, however, they also need to be prepared for potential fluctuations in the future by saving more. Especially poor households will be affected by the food and price volatility

as they spend a relatively large proportion of their income on food. Also the supply side will be affected by volatility, because the business and investment risk will increase (Food and Agricultural, 2013b:82).

Also the national or country level suffers from volatile food prices, especially when the national economy is highly integrated with the international market, because price fluctuations make it difficult to create foreign exchange through export. The value of food imports over total merchandise exports indicates a country's ability to finance the import of food through its export products and services. A country's inability to finance its food import through its exports becomes problematic when the prices on the international food market rise, making it difficult for a country to satisfy its food demand, and taking away funding from other sectors as well, which is now allocated to the purchase of food. In Africa the value of food imports over total merchandise exports has decreased from 16% in 1995 to merely 9% in 2007. In recent years the continent has been better able to finance its imports through its exports, however the percentage remains 10% to 11%, negatively affecting its food security status (FAOSTAT, 2015).

As can be seen in the following graph, food prices in Africa as a whole and Sub-Saharan Africa more specifically, have been highly volatile since the turn of the century. The region has been highly affected by price fluctuations, especially as a result of the food crisis in 2008. The year following this crisis the food price volatility index in Sub-Saharan Africa increased from 9.1 to 17.0 in order to drop to 3.8 a year later. Only the previous two years the volatility has stabilised (FAOSTAT, 2015).

Figure 3.4: Domestic food price volatility in Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa (2000-2014)
(FAOSTAT, 2015)



Food price fluctuations can also significantly affect the access to food, as high food prices will lead to an increased share of the income to be spend on food. To measure the value of the purchase of food in the overall household expenditures the domestic food price index is used. This index will be high for developing countries. Unfortunately, due to the volatility of global food prices during the previous years, this index has increased substantially from 1.83 in 2000 to 2.18 in 2013 indicating that the Africans need to spend a significantly larger share of their income on food than 10 or 15 years ago (FAOSTAT, 2015). Besides economic accessibility, also physical access to food is an important aspect of food accessibility. Adequate infrastructure is often lacking in Africa, though important in facilitating economic activities and the distribution of food. Unfortunately, there is very little data available measuring the road and railway density and status on the African continent. However, it is to say that in

most African countries these values are very low and below 30% of roads are paved (Food and Agricultural, 2013b:78-79).

Finally, the progress of food utilisation in Africa is measured by examining the access to improved sanitation facilities and water sources. In order for the body to absorb minerals and nutrients a good health is required. Therefore, access to proper water and sanitation facilities affects the individual's ability to consume food. Unfortunately, Africa remains the continent with the highest percentage of the population without access to water sources and sanitation facilities (Food and Agricultural, 2013b:80). On a global level, there has been a decline of 24% of people living without access to water sources since 1990 and the relevant MDG concerning this topic has already been reached. However, this picture does not hold for Africa where the proportion of the population with access to drinking water only increased from 55.1% to 68.7% in the same period. The same accounts for access to sanitation facilities, which increased from 33.9% in 1990 to 39.4% in 2012. The values for Sub-Saharan Africa, again are significantly lower. Here, 29.9% of the population had access to sanitation facilities in 2012 and 64.9% to clean water sources (FAOSTAT, 2015)

2.3 Concluding remarks

On the basis of these indicators it is possible to give a detailed description of the legitimacy of the traditional ODA system providing food assistance. ODA scores well on representativeness (score = 4), since the WFP and the FAO, who provide the majority of the food assistance, are both multilateral agencies incorporating governments from both the developed and developing world. However, there is a lack of representation of the target group through the inadequate involvement of local civil society organisations. This is also reflected in the system's level of inclusion. Because of the multilateral nature of the aid system it is expected that all the stakeholders are included in the decision-making process. Both the WFP and the FAO rotating board members, who all have an equal say in managing the organisations. Unfortunately, it can be concluded that despite this organisational set up stakeholders and target groups in the developing world are

underrepresented in the decision-making process, as a result of a lack of collaboration with local NGOs. Therefore, ODA scores average on inclusion (score = 3).

Transparency has been a highly criticised point and has been high on the development agenda in recent years. Consequently, most international organisations providing food assistance are now publishing their internal reports and forward plans. However, transparency as a result of fragmentation remains a point of critique and makes it extremely difficult to coordinate all the organisations active in the field. Although the food assistance system is somewhat less fragmented, because of the coordinating role of the WFP, there is a growing number of small NGOs who do not fall under its realm. Moreover, bilateral food assistance is also increasingly being provided by countries who are no signatories to the Busan Agreement, therefore not necessarily committed to its rules. As a result, transparency remains a critical point (score = 2). This also affects the level of deliberation between the actors involved. Fortunately, overall, the communication between, as well as within food assistance organisations occurs frequently. The large multilateral organisations have regular meetings and discuss their policy with their members. Moreover, since recently, the main players IFAD, WFP and FAO have also stepped up their communication and cooperation concerning their activities. Therefore, the ODA system scores well on deliberation (score = 4).

The traditional ODA system scores well on goal rationality (score = 5). The goals are clearly indicated, improving food security, and the actors are actively working towards achieving these goals. However, whether their efforts have been effective is debatable. The nature of the World Bank's definition of aid effectiveness requires caution in drawing conclusions, because who is to say that high or low levels of development could not have been caused by external factors such as natural disasters, corruption or economic growth? This makes it difficult to assess its effectiveness. It could be argued, however, that overall, important improvements have taken place and food security has improved over the past two decades. However, this progress have been slow, especially compared to other developing regions, where food security has been improving more rapidly. Moreover, progress has also been characterised significant variation among African countries in progress, as well as between the indicators. For

example, in most countries high availability of food is associated with low levels of undernourishment. However, in Egypt, Benin, Malawi and Niger, among others dietary supply adequacy varies between 110 to 140, while the proportion of stunted children under age 5 ranged between 20 to 45% of the population (Food and Agricultural, 2013b:76). These results could point to the presence of particular groups suffering from acute undernourishment, but also to the skewed distribution or targeting of the food assistance to these countries. Consequently, effectiveness requires significant improvement (score = 2).

3 Analysis: legitimacy of three Public-Private Partnerships for food security in Africa

All three case studies, which have been selected for this research, have been part of the Schokland Agreement. In June 2007, the Dutch Minister for Development Cooperation and Trade initiated a large event to bring together civil society, public and private actors in order to combine efforts to optimize the Dutch contribution to achieve the Millennium Development Goals by 2015. 36 agreements got signed and another 2000 individuals pledged their support to the agreements. This event became known as the Pact of Schokland. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs created the Schokland Fund, a subsidy framework which translated the Pact into concrete regulation. In 2008 27 projects were selected to become part of the Schokland Agreement and another 26 got selected in 2010. All partnerships are made up of cross-sectorial partners and the Ministry is an active partner in each of them. All are concerned with one or more of the MDGs (Van Gerwen and Van Ede, 2014:11-13).

MDG1, concerned with poverty reduction and food security, includes the largest amount of projects. In total, 5 out of the 54 projects focus on food security, making it one of the largest categories (Van Gerwen and Van Ede, 2014:33). This is no surprise, as food security is one of the focus areas of the Dutch development policy. Annually, it spends approximately 350 million euro on improving food and nutrition security. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs “food and nutrition security is achieved if adequate food (quantity, quality, safety, socio-cultural acceptability) is available and accessible for, and satisfactorily utilized by, all individuals at all times to live a healthy and happy life” (Ministry of Foreign, 2013:4). Although the Ministry was already engaged in several Public-Private Partnership, the Schokland Agreement led the way to an increased focus on development-oriented partnerships in Dutch policy (Van Gerwen and Van Ede, 2014:11-13).

3.1. Case studies

3.1.1. Increase food security and improve livelihoods of sorghum and rice producers

Background

This partnership was established in 2001 between international beer brewer Heineken and the European Cooperative for Rural Development (EUCORD). EUCORD is a Belgian-based non-profit organisation, which seeks to cooperate with the private sector in order to develop rural communities through training, creating value chains and farmer organizations (Sopov et al, 2014:14). The partnership was already established before the Schokland Agreement, from personal contacts at the managerial level between Heineken and EUCORD. During an event organised by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which aimed at bringing together actors from the private sector and civil society, the partners decided to cooperate in their mutual interest in local sourcing. Heineken has a long-standing history in Africa and a growing interest for local sourcing, which would be beneficial for both the company as well as the local region, therefore contributing to economic development (Stanger, 2015: personal interview). EUCORD, in turn, had expertise in working with the private sector for rural, agricultural development projects for several years. When Tom de Man, (Heineken's former Regional President for Africa and the Middle East) was asked by Sierra Leone's President to invest in local farmers and agriculture EUCORD was invited to examine the possibilities (Knipscheer, 2015: personal interview). Three years later the partners launched pilot projects in Sierra Leone and Ghana.

These countries were selected because of practical reasons. Due to the personal relations between Tom de Man and Henk Knipscheer (Senior Advisor at EUCORD), and their contacts in Sierra Leone, this country was a logical starting-point. Ghana was selected mostly because EUCORD was vested there, but also because Heineken was already actively pursuing local sourcing there. Both projects were perceived as great successes. On average, the participating farmers' incomes doubled within the first three

years after the project's initiation (Knipscheer, 2015:personal interview). As a result, the partners applied for additional funding from the Schokland Pact and their efforts got extended to Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo, two so called 'partner countries' of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The projects in Sierra Leone and Ghana where concluded in 2009 and 2010 respectively. As a result, the Pact of Schokland should not only be seen as the initiator of the partnership, but also as an accelerator (Van Gerwen and Van Ede, 2014:107).

The projects in Burundi and DRC started in 2010 and varied widely in scope and success. Both countries were 'partner countries' of the Dutch government, meaning that there is a special relationship between the two with regard to development coopeation. Heineken has also been actively brewing beer here for decades. In DRC these activities occurred on a large scale, as beer brewer Bralima, owned by Heineken International, operates six different plants. Consequently, the project in DRC had a significant impact and grew to include 57,355 families. In Burundi, Heineken's operating company Brarudi only has two production locations and the project reached 10,852 families (Van Gerwen and Van Ede, 2014:42). The crops were selected on the basis of their benefit for both the breweries as well as for the local producers. Therefore, in DRC the partners decided to use rice as a raw material for the production of beer. In Burundi sorghum was selected. (Middelhoff, 2015: personal interview).

In 2012, the project got enlarged as the Schokland Agreement got a follow up and significant upscale by means of the Community Revenue Enhancement through Agricultural Technology Extension (CREATE) programme. As a result of the success of the projects in DRC and Burundi, three more partner countries were selected in which Heineken has local breweries. These were Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Ethiopia (Middelhoff, 2015: personal interview). Sierra Leone got included a second time, because of the growth of the local sorghum market, which would provide the brewery with sufficient raw materials for its beer production. During the first project phase, the brewery had long been unable to obtain sufficient raw materials, so the enlargement of the market was a requirement for the renewal of the project (Knipscheer, 2015: personal interview). Ethiopia was particularly interesting for Heineken, because of its significant growth of the national beer consumption. Moreover, as one of the few African countries,

Ethiopia has the right climate for the production of barley (Knipscheer, 2015: personal interview).

Partners' goals and motives

The partnership aims at improving food security and livelihoods of local grain producers. This is done by developing a local supply chain, in which small-holder farmers produce raw materials for Heineken's local brewery and the local market. The farmers are trained by EUCORD on the cultivation of crops such as maize, rice and sorghum, among others, and are provided with high quality and high yielding grain varieties, which enables them to improve their harvest. Consequently, it is expected that they will have more food to consume. Moreover, the farmers are also expected to have more disposable income, because their yield surplus can be sold on the local market and/or to Heineken's local brewery. As a result, of the increased availability of food on the local markets, the food availability of the wider community will also increase (Middelhoff, 2015: personal interview).

These expectations are based on Heineken's policy around local sourcing, which means that, by 2020, Heineken's beer brewing plants acquire at least 60% of their raw materials locally, instead of importing these from abroad. By doing so, the company will create a market for the local farmers (Stanger, 2015: personal interview). The long-term goal is to create a self-sustaining supply chain "where the added value in the chain is shared, so that the farmer makes enough money to make it worthwhile to replant and resell again, the middle-men and other businesses all maintain their profit and we can still buy the end product at a price which is economically viable for us as well" (Stanger, 2015: personal interview). Eventually, the efforts of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and EUCORD in this partnership would become redundant as the farmers will be able to maintain the supply chain and provide raw materials to the brewery.

The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and EUCORD are both involved in this partnership, because of the developmental aspect. Both believe in the potential for long-term economic growth by fostering partnership between civil society, the public and private sector. Cooperating in this partnership allows both to aid in creating sustainable

improvement in the food security of local farmers in Africa (Knipscheer, 2015: personal interview; Middelhoff, 2015: personal interview). As Middelhoff (2015: personal interview) pointed out: “cooperating on this level will allow for a larger project reach, more families will be involved, which results in a greater multiplier effect for the local economy”. EUCORD is primarily focussed on benefiting the farmer’s interest. Its aims to improve the livelihoods of farmer families by creating sustainable value chains with the private sector, in order to develop the rural communities. As a result of Heineken’s involvement in the partnership, the market for the farmer’s produce is guaranteed. Therefore, farmers are now willing to invest in crops that used to be primarily employed for household consumption and, with the aid of EUCORD, transform them into cash crops, leaving the farmers with higher yield as well as more income. This guaranteed market was therefore an important motivation for EUCORD to become involved in the partnership as it significantly improves the possibility to effectively develop local farmer communities (Knipscheer, 2015: personal interview). The Ministry has a wider perspective as it aims at increasing the overall food security and development of the region, in order to work towards achieving Millennium Goal 1 (Middelhoff, 2015: personal interview). Heineken also has this developmental aspect in mind and is logically also business-oriented.

With respect to its business approach it has the following interests. First, investing in this project significantly shortens the supply chain for Heineken. Instead of importing its raw materials from Europe or North America, the breweries can now obtain their products locally. This increases their flexibility to adapt to sudden changes in the market. Second, when the raw materials are produced locally, the production costs will be high, due to the small-holder farmers’ capacity, but the transportation costs remain low. Taking into account that there is a lot of potential for these farmers to increase their capacity and grow their production, the brewery’s cost structure can decrease (Stanger, 2015: personal interview). The costs will further be decreased by the fact that through local importation of raw materials, the brewery can circumvent costs involved with the exchange of currency (Knipscheer, 2015: personal interview). Consequently, local sourcing will be more cost-effective.

Another motive for Heineken to become involved in this partnership is that it creates a positive dialogue between the brewery and the African ministries of Finance and Agriculture. For example, Heineken has conversations not only with the finance minister who wants to increase the tax on beer, but also with the agricultural minister. Virtually every Africa economy² is for 70% to 80% reliant on agriculture, which mainly consists of small-holder farmers (Stanger, 2015: personal interview). Increasing the tax on beer would decrease Heineken's profit, which makes it more difficult for the company to invest in the local agriculture. "We have a dual responsibility. We have the commercial benefits that we want to deliver, but it is also very much in our interest that farmers improve their practices and increase their yield as this will generate income. This will benefit the local economic. If the economy grows and people have more disposable income then more people can afford to make the step from homemade beer into commercially brewed beer" (Stanger, 2015: personal interview).

Organisational set up

As becomes evident from the above, this partnership is a clear business-driven case. The official partnership exists between Heineken and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Both partners bring in 50% of the financial means. The Ministry channels these through Heineken, which contributes partly in cash and partly in-kind. Heineken, in turn, contracts EUCORD. Together, the Ministry, Heineken and EUCORD operate a steering group from the Netherlands and from Brussels, where the partners meet to discuss the PPPs general policy regarding the projects in the various countries. This is done on the basis of equality of the partners; EUCORD brings its technical and agronomical expertise to the table, the Ministry its contacts and knowledge of and experience with development projects, and Heineken its experience in doing business in Africa (Middelhoff, 2015: personal interview).

Heineken provides the market for the farmers and together with EUCORD selects the farmer communities and the crop that will be used. Based on Heineken's demand, EUCORD contracts and organises farmers to initiate cultivating grains for the brewery.

² With the exception of South Africa.

The farmers are supplied with improved grain varieties and receive training on how to effectively cultivate their land and increase their yield. EUCORD also teaches them to be more business-oriented, in order to know when to sell the produce and to whom. Finally, the farmers get educated on nutrition and HIV/AIDS. These workshops are not solely executed by EUCORD. The NGO educates local field extension agents among small-holder farmers to assist them. This, in order for the project to become self-sustaining. During harvest EUCORD assists the farmers in collecting the yield and delivering it to the brewery (Hueskens, 2013:7). The Ministry, together with the local embassies, assists the partners with its network of government representatives and its knowledge about local NGOs and other third parties that are involved in the partnership, when required. As Stanger (2015: personal interview) pointed out: “the local embassy’s network and contacts are very important. If I want to do something in region X, the local embassies are the ones that I will be asking: Which is the right NGO to be talking to?”.

Besides the relationship between the partners on the managerial level, they also cooperate on a local or in-country level. The majority of the local executive decisions are being made at this level, primarily between local representatives of EUCORD and the local brewery (Knipscheer, 2015: personal interview). These breweries, such as Bralima in DRC, have a fairly independent status, since Heineken prefers not to micromanage (Stanger, 2015: personal interview). Therefore, the breweries have a relatively large voice in the day-to-day decision-making process. They set the markets for the farmers, who will then be trained and equipped with crop varieties by EUCORD. The local embassies in turn are the ones who maintain contacts with local government representatives, but also with other third parties and NGO’s, which are sometimes contracted by EUCORD for their expertise in a particular field. Moreover, they assist EUCORD with technical advice through the embassies’ agricultural counsels, consisting of embassy staff with expertise in agricultural practises (Middelhoff, 2015: personal interview).

EUCORD also aims at creating an advisory committee in each of the project countries. These committees are comprised of value chain stakeholders. Normally one or two government representatives, for example from the Ministry of Agriculture, are involved, a person from the finance or banking world and someone from an agricultural

knowledge institute. Preferably, several of these persons have a background in farming, however there is no formal representation of the farmers in these committees (Knipscheer, 2015: personal interview).

Legitimacy of the partnership

Based on the above, it is possible to make an analysis of this PPP's legitimacy. The partnership allows for a proper representation of almost all of its stakeholders. Two private actors are involved, Heineken International and the local brewery, at least one civil society actor, in this case EUCORD is represented, however, frequently other NGO's are attracted too, and public actors from both the developed country, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the developing country, through the local government and national ministries, are represented. As a result, this partnership scores well on representativeness. It should be noted, however, that local governments and NGOs or other third parties do not form part of the official partnership. Moreover, local farmers are not sufficiently represented, nor included. They are not embodied by a farmer's cooperation, for example. Only through meetings with EUCORD they can voice their opinion about the project's policies.

With regards to the level of inclusion of the partnership, it should be noted that not all of the stakeholders mentioned above take part in the decision-making process. Stanger (2015: personal interview) pointed out that this is also a consequence of the "need for speed and momentum", especially when it concerns short-term decisions. As mentioned before, the general policy is set on a managerial level by Heineken, EUCORD and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the executive decisions are being made on a local level, mostly between these three partners, and regularly in collaboration with third parties (Stanger, 2015: personal interview). However, through the steering committees local stakeholders in the value chain do have the opportunity to influence the decisions being made, as EUCORD and the local brewery consult them for their agronomical and economic experience and expertise (Knipscheer, 2015: personal interview).

As a result, there is a fair share of deliberation and transparency between the partners. Despite what the contract might suggest, there exists little to no hierarchy between the partners. It is to say that Heineken is in the lead in this partnership, but the decisions are being made in consultation with each other. Each partner has an equal say in the decision-making process and can suggest policy or procedural changes. Moreover, all have access to the same information (Knipscheer, 2015: personal interview; Middelhoff, 2015: personal interview; Stanger, 2015: personal interview). The partners at the managerial level meet on a regular basis. Officially, there is a monthly call, a quarterly meeting and a six-month review in which the project is evaluated and possible adjustments to the policy are being made. Besides these scheduled meetings, there is regular phone and mail contact as well. On the executive level, on the other hand, the partners are regularly communicating about the day-to-day state of affairs (Stanger, 2015: personal interview).

Despite this equal status of the partners, there is a more hierarchical method in place with regards to taking responsibility of one's actions. Officially, EUCORD has to report to Heineken and both, in turn are held accountable by the Ministry. Together with Heineken, EUCORD writes an annual report and a forward plan that is controlled by a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Stanger, 2015: personal interview). Normally, these reports do not contain many surprises, because of the transparency between the partners. This adds to a valuable level of trust, which adds to the partnership's effectiveness (Middelhoff, 2015: personal interview).

Because several of the projects are relatively new (Ethiopia and Rwanda) and most of them are still on-going, it is somewhat difficult to completely assess the PPPs effectiveness, all the more because of the variation between the countries. As mentioned before, the goal is to develop sustainable local supply chains in order for the brewery to obtain at least 60% of its raw materials locally (Stanger, 2015: personal interview). The means to achieve this goal are clearly indicated, as EUCORD is the partner mostly concerned with the execution hereof. Unfortunately, this starts with whether the brewery is actively working towards achieving this goal. According to Knipscheer (2015: personal interview) this was one of the reasons the project in DRC was a success since its initiation, while it struggled in Burundi.

The project in DRC has been successful. Heineken's subsidiary Bralima signed 66 contracts with local suppliers who purchase and assemble the rice produced by the small-holder farmers. The majority of the farmers, trained by EUCORD, indicated to have greater confidence to invest in the production of rice. Consequently, the average yield per hectare has increased 20% and the average marketed surplus even grew with 60%. Food security of the families involved increased significantly as well, with 67% of the households consuming two meals a day in 2012, as to 58% before the start of the project three years earlier (Hueskens, 2013:4-5). Currently, the brewer's total demand for rice is covered by local small-holder farmers. As a result, the project ended successfully and has now been taken over by BRALIMA, which continued to contract EUCORD. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is no longer formally involved, as the supply chain is almost completely self-sustaining (Middelhoff, 2015: personal interview).

The project in Burundi was less effective from the onset and Heineken stood at a critical point whether to continue with its investments. This was due to several reasons. First, because EUCORD was not yet officially registered in the country, it took several months to have this arranged, which meant that the NGO could only take up activities afterwards. Second, the process of finding the right crop which could be used by the brewery, and that grew well in the Burundese climate and was relevant for the local market, was very time-consuming. After looking into rice and maize, the partners decided to produce sorghum. Unfortunately, the sorghum varieties that already grew in Burundi were unfit for the beer production and their yields were too low. Therefore, new varieties were tested by EUCORD in cooperation with the agricultural institute of the University of Burundi, on their applicability and suitability for the local farmers (Knipscheer, 2015: personal interview). After this process was concluded, it took several months to register the new variety at the Burundese Ministry of Agriculture (Middelhoff, 2015: personal interview).

Despite the difficult start of the project, it has now grown significantly, as a result of the successful introduction of the 100% sorghum beer, Nyongera, by Brarudi. Currently, approximately 2,000 farmers are involved in four different provinces. By the end of the project period in 2017 around 8,000 farmers are expected to be involved. The new sorghum varieties, aided by the technological training from EUCORD produce on

average 2 to 3 ton of sorghum per hectare, compared to merely 0,5 ton for the local varieties. Sorghum remains the priority crop, but the production of rice is also being considered because of its relevance on the local market, therefore widening the scope of the project and further improving household food security. This is a critical point, since sorghum remains a less preferred food crop in Burundi compared to maize, rice and cassava (Sopov et al, 2014:18-22). However, as a result of the project, the government of Burundi is progressively recognizing the importance of sorghum as both a food and a cash crop and is stimulating support programmes in order to further utilize its potential (Van Gerwen and Van Ede, 2014:110).

The three newest projects under the CREATE programme are too young to draw strong conclusions on their effectiveness. The project in Ethiopia, however, is looking promising, because of the significant potential for growth in the market. Rwanda, on the other hand, experienced similar problems as Burundi. Again, EUCORD was not yet registered and it was difficult to find the right crop. After having looked into the production of sorghum and rice, eventually, it has been decided to grow maize. Lastly, the project in Sierra Leone has been interrupted, due to the ebola outbreak in the summer of 2014. The project is expected to restart again this summer (Middelhoff, 2015: personal interview).

Overall however, it could be argued that this PPP is rather successful in creating an effective value chain. The PPP scores well on both the input and output legitimacy indicators. The largest improvement could be made concerning inclusion and goal rationality. The local farmers are only limitedly represented and included in the decision-making process. They could voice their opinion through EUCORD and the steering committees, but this is merely on a subordinate basis. Moreover, the local governments are also barely incorporated in the decision-making process. For a PPP to be a legitimate instrument it is important to incorporate the local stakeholders in the decision-making process. After all, they are the ones affected by the project. The partnership's goal rationality could be improved as well, because the means to reach the goals are not always sufficiently addressed by the local brewers, depending on the management in place. In Ethiopia, for example, the brewery was highly supportive of the project, while in Burundi, the brewery initially stood hesitant towards cooperation

with civil society and was reserved in collaborating with EUCORD. However, at the moment, also this collaboration appears to be successful (Knipscheer, 2015: personal interview).

Besides these organisational improvements, it remains difficult to draw strong conclusions on the improvement of food security in the project regions and assess whether the multiplier effect actually appeared. As mentioned earlier, in Burundi, for example, the crop being used for the production of beer, sorghum, is less preferred by local households as a food crop. Instead, maize, rice, beans and cassava are favoured, reducing the project's influence on local food security (Sopov et al, 2014:22). A similar issue is of importance in DRC, where rice is cultivated for Heineken's subsidiaries. However, rice is primarily consumed by the upper and higher middle class. The underprivileged primarily eat cassava (Knipscheer, 2015: personal interview). Despite these remarks, it should be pointed out that food security has improved on average in both DRC and Burundi. In DRC the amount of people consuming just one meal daily decreased in all project sites and the majority now consumes two meals a day (Hueskens, 2013:20). Strong conclusions about food security in the other countries cannot yet be drawn, as they are still in an early phase.

Overall, the partnership is working effectively towards its goals in a transparent and deliberative manner. Furthermore, there are two positive side effects to be pointed out. First, after Heineken other international brewers such as Diageo and SABMiller have started local sourcing as well, and second, there is a considerable influx of families moving to the project regions, eager to benefit from the partnership (Knipscheer, 2015: personal interview). It should be pointed out, however, that this influx could also put pressure on the land, thus eventually negatively impacting the yield (Middelhoff, 2015: personal interview).

3.1.2. Helping farmers produce cassava for profit

Background

This partnership, also called 'Cassava+', got established in 2009 between the International Fertilizer Development Centre (IFDC) and the Dutch Agricultural Development and Trading company (DADTCO). IFDC is a US-based, international, non-profit organisation, which aims to improve developing countries' agricultural sector by means of providing agribusiness and technological expertise (International Fertilizer Development, 2015). DADTCO is a young company, established in 2002, which focusses on agricultural development through creating "innovative technologies and business models for commercial development of crop processing" (Dutch Agricultural Development, 2015). Both partners met during the Pact of Schokland. DADTCO had been active for some time already in Nigeria with its new technology to process cassava. IFDC recognized the potential this crop had to offer for small-holder farmers and was interested in cooperating in a Public-Private Partnership (De Jager, 2015: personal interview).

Although being one of Africa's main food crops cassava is primarily produced by small-holder farmers for private consumption. The root remains exceptionally resistant against the dry climate many African regions face. It is possible to produce cassava even on marginal soils where other crops, such as sorghum and maize, are unable to grow. Moreover, cassava does not need to be harvested within a short time frame. Instead, it can remain in the ground unharvested for one and a half to two years, making it significantly useful as a subsistence crop (Calon, 2015: personal interview; De Jager, 2015: personal interview). Unfortunately, despite these beneficial characteristics, approximately 90% of the cassava in Africa is home-consumed (International Fertilizer Development, 2013:1).

This is mostly due to the crop's high perishability. Cassava needs to be processed into a stable commodity within 48 hours after being harvested or it will deteriorate (De Jager, 2015: personal interview). Recognizing this unfavourable trait, but also seeing cassava's potential on the local, national and international market, as the crop can be a

substitute for wheat flour, glucose and starch, DADTCO developed the Autonomous Mobile Processing Unit (AMPU) (International Fertilizer Development, 2013:2). Instead of transporting the cassava towards the processing site, these AMPUs can be transported to the production sites, making it possible for the farmers to have their cassava processed within 48 hours. The AMPUs transform the cassava roots into High Quality Cassava Cake (HQCC), which can be stored and saved for further processing. This is an important development as it makes it possible for cassava to be used for economic and industrial purposes, instead of largely remaining a subsistence crop. However, as the HQCC is not the final product, it is necessary to contract an industrial actor as end, who process the cakes and thus provides the market for the produce (Calon, 2015: personal interview). In Nigeria the roots were transformed into flour, while in Ghana and Mozambique it is used for the production of cassava-based beer (International Fertilizer Development, 2013:2-3).

The Schokland Pact provided the partners with an opportunity to further develop DADTCO's efforts in Nigeria. DADTCO had already been active there since 2002, when the Nigerian government, under the Presidential Initiative for Cassava, had decided that at least 10% of the flour used for the production of bakery products ought to be derived from cassava (Calon, 2015: personal interview). This offered potential for the development of local value chains, and with the help of the Schokland Fund DADTCO and IFDC decided to cooperate in order to work towards this goal. IFDC would train the farmers in cultivating cassava and improving their yield and DADTCO would provide the market and processing of the cassava after harvest. In 2009, DADTCO initiated a market assessment in order to develop a solid marketing plan as to start local interventions together with IFDC. Five regions with high clusters of cassava farmers were selected, including 1.195 farmers in 2012 supplying 4.457 metric tons of cassava roots to the AMPUs (International Fertilizer Development, 2013:6). Unfortunately, due to several internal and external factors the project got terminated before its end-date (De Jager, 2015: personal interview).

First of all, the Presidential Initiative for Cassava was not enforced properly, due to lobbying activities of government representatives who benefited more from the importation of wheat than from locally grown cassava. This significantly affected the

flour market and reduced the demand for cassava. Consequently, it was difficult for DADTCO to find a market for the farmers' produce. This got hindered further when in one production site the starch factory had to be closed due to factors beyond control of DADTCO (De Jager, 2015: personal interview). Also political frictions aided to the external factors, as the production sites were located near areas in which terrorist organisation Boko Haram gained ground (Calon, 2015: personal interview).

Besides these external factors, some internal frictions also thwarted the cooperation between the partners. First, there was no clear agreement on each partner's roles and responsibilities in the project. The contract regarding the PPP got signed between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and IFDC. DADTCO was only officially involved in the partnership through a memorandum of understanding with IFDC, which lacked a detailed description of the roles and responsibilities of each partner. Initially, when both partners were enthusiastic and eager to embark on the project, this did not cause any frictions. However, due to the external setbacks these issues rose to the surface and affected the communication between the partners (Calon, 2015: personal interview; De Jager, 2015: personal interview).

This became clearly visible with regards to the planning of the stationing of the AMPUs. As cassava requires a year to a year and a half to grow, IFDC is expected to start training the farmers approximately two years before the arrival of the AMPU. Consequently, the stationing of the AMPUs needs to be planned accordingly. Due to changes in the market, among others, it has occurred that DADTCO eventually had to adjust its plans, which left the farmers without a market for their produce. This resulted in frictions between DADTCO and IFDC, because the latter felt it had to take responsibility and inform the farmers. Moreover, it proved difficult to make long-term agreements, as the DADTCO management was perceived to take "ad hoc decisions from time to time", partially because it is a relatively small and young company, which rendered it less capable to cope with economic setbacks (De Jager, 2015: personal interview). Because the roles and responsibilities were not clearly defined, these circumstances thwarted the cooperation between the partners.

Despite these developments, in 2011, the partners decided to renew cooperation. Taking the lessons learned into account and incorporating DADTCO as a signatory

partner to the contract, the partners established a project in Mozambique, which got extended to Ghana a year later. As part of the follow-up programme of the Schokland Pact, the 2Scale programme gave IFDC the possibility to create PPPs in several African countries. DADTCO proved to be an interesting partner in one of these, namely Mozambique, as it was rapidly expanding its production here, due to a partnership with beer brewer SABMiller. Cassava could be used for the production of beer as a substitute for barley. Moreover, the cassava cakes produced by the AMPUs contained a significantly larger proportion of starch than do original ingredients such as sorghum or barley, therefore reducing the brewer's production costs (International Fertilizer Development, 2013:25). SABMiller's subsidiary Cervejas de Mocambique launched a cassava-based beer, called Impala, in Mozambique in 2011, which became successful as it was perceived to be a low cost, high quality beer that could compete with the low-entry home-grown beers in rural areas. Therefore, DADTCO could provide the farmers with a growing market for their produce. In order to expand the production, IFDC and DADTCO together combined efforts to develop the local value chains (Van Melick, 2015: personal interview).

Since its initiation in 2011 600 farmers became involved in the project in Mozambique, who together supplied approximately 2,800 metric tons of cassava roots to DADTCO in 2012, which in turn processed it into 1,600 metric ton cassava cakes. These numbers increased slightly during the following year, resulting in 2,989 metric ton of roots being process into approximately 1,650 metric ton of cassava cake. (International Fertilizer Development, 2013:28, 30). Because of this growth the project got expanded to Ghana in 2012, where IFDC and DADTCO cooperated with SABMiller as well. Cassava is Ghana's main food crop and the country is the fourth largest producer of the root in Africa, making it an interesting location for the PPP. Although this project was marginal compared to the one in Mozambique, expectations were significant as, without previous experience in the country, SABMiller launched the cassava-based beer 'Eagle' in 2013 (International Fertilizer Development, 2013:33).

Because the project was still in its initiation phase DADTCO was only able to start operating its AMPU in January of that year. Consequently, no farmers were officially organized and registered to provide supply, nor did IFDC have time to train

them. Therefore, DADTCO purchased cassava roots on an ad hoc basis from “ready-to-harvest fields” (International Fertilizer Development, 2013:32-36). Unfortunately, the partnership between DADTCO and IFDC had a very short lifespan, as DADTCO decided to terminate the project in the eastern region of the country in June 2013, due to problems concerning the quality of the water required for the production of the cassava cakes and due to the rising prices of the local cassava roots (International Fertilizer Development, 2013:36). Moreover, as in Nigeria, the IFDC management in West-Africa and DADTCO experienced communication problems. The activities in Mozambique were led by a different division from IFDC than in Ghana and Nigeria and both DADTCO and IFDC were able to develop a more sustainable relationship here (De Jager, 2015: personal interview).

Based on the above it is safe to say that the project has been turbulent. The partnership appears to be more robust in Mozambique, as Nigeria and Ghana have been faced with both internal and external malfunctions. Learning from the problems DADTCO became a signatory partner to the contract between IFDC and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the 2Scale programme in Mozambique and Ghana. Moreover, in order to assure there was a market for the produce, DADTCO only initiated production in Ghana and Mozambique after it had signed a contract with SABMiller, therefore gaining trust from the farmers. This soothed communication between IFDC and DADTCO, as both could develop their part of the value chain, because the market was provided for. Both partners are now satisfied with the cooperation in Mozambique and the project appears to be successful (van Melick, 2015: personal interview). It should be noted however, that despite these efforts there still remains some threats to the local and household food security. It has been acknowledged that many of the farmers still operate on a short-term approach. As cassava does not have a specific harvesting time, nor has DADTCO set a threshold, farmers tend to sell cassava when the household’s needs are highest, instead of when the roots are at their optimal growth. This might cause food insecurity in later stages (Sopov et al, 2014:74).

Partners' goals and motives

With regards to goals and motives, this partnership resembles the PPP between Heineken and EUCORD. “The project’s primary mission was to strengthen smallholder farmers’ access to value-added markets for cassava products by facilitating the development of a sustainable cassava value chain” (International Fertilizer Development, 2013:2). Through training and by providing the farmers with a market for their surplus, the partners aim to transform cassava from a subsistence crop into a cash crop. Food security is expected to increase as farmers are enabled to raise their yield and sell the surplus on the local market. Thus increasing the supply of food. Besides, the farmers themselves will also have more disposable income, which allows them to increase their consumption and overall development (Calon, 2015: personal interview; Van Melick, 2015: personal interview).

DADTCO’s social entrepreneurship facilitated finding common ground between the partners. The company’s CEO used to be active in the field of development studies and incorporated this into DADTCO’s ideology. Consequently, social corporate responsibility is an intrinsic aspect of the company’s grounds (Calon, 2015: personal interview). Besides DADTCO, also the other two partners acknowledged the potential cassava has to offer. As pointed out before, it is one of the largest food crops in Africa, however, it is barely used for industrial purposes. Because of its value for African smallholder farmers, it is an opportune crop to be used to improve local food security. Many projects have attempted to exploit this potential in local development projects, but were often halted by the roots high perishability. DADTCO’s AMPUs bypass this problem, as the processing unit can be transported to the farmer, instead of the farmer having to transport his produce to the processing unit. IFDC, who has been working to improve agricultural productivity in developing countries for many years, recognized the technology’s potency as an important development to improve small-holder farmers’ food security and became motivated to cooperate with DADTCO. With minimal input one could produce 8 to 10 ton of cassava roots per hectare. However, a small investment in varieties and crop rotation could already increase this number up to 20 to 25 tons per hectare, indicating the potential (De Jager, 2015: personal interview). The same could

be said for the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who was actively looking for innovative ways to improve food security and work towards achieving Millennium Development Goal 1 (Calon, 2015: personal interview).

Unfortunately, during later stages of the project some differences in goals and motives rose to the surface as well. Despite their social incentives DADTCO as a private actor is obligated to make profit. As a relatively young enterprise it did not have much saved for a rainy day. This became visible when the project in Nigeria stagnated (De Jager, 2015: personal interview). DADTCO now had to prioritize its business merits and adapt its policies accordingly, while the public actors pushed for continuation of the ideological importance. This has led to conflicts of interest between the partners (De Jager, 2015: personal interview; Van Melick, 2015: personal interview).

Organisational set up

As mentioned before, the partnership between the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, IFDC and DADTCO originally merely was an official partnership between the former two partners. DADTCO was no formal signatory to the contract. Instead, the cooperation between IFDC and DADTCO got written down in a memorandum of understanding. Consequently, DADTCO was officially not in a partnership with the Dutch government. IFDC received funding from the Ministry, €6 million in total, in order to develop the upstream activities of the cassava value chain, which revolved around the cultivation of the cassava roots. Depending on the project, IFDC cooperated with some other actors as well for their expertise. For example, in Mozambique, IFDC contracted the IIAM (Mozambique Institute for Agricultural Research) to develop improved cassava seeds (De Jager, 2015: personal interview).

DADTCO invested itself in those particular activities of the project it participated in. These involved the downstream processes, including the transportation of the AMPUs to the farmers, the processing of the cassava into cakes and flour, and securing the market for the produce. IFDC's activities involved "working with farmer organizations to identify participating farmers and build their organizational capacity, increasing productivity of farmers' yields through the dissemination of Good

Agricultural Practices (GAP), and strengthening of agro-input services such as stems, fertilizers, and farm equipment” (International Fertilizer Development, 2013:2). The Ministry does not take an active role in this partnership, but primarily functions as the financier and controller of the annual plan and budget (Calon, 2015: personal interview).

This division of labour would allow the partners to operate in their own areas of expertise. Unfortunately, it did not remain sustainable as the planning of the process was not always executed well. As mentioned before, DADTCO decided where it would transport its AMPUs to and IFDC arranged for the farmers to be organized to have the produce delivered on time. This required close collaboration between the partners. When the communication did not take place as expected IFDC was the one to be held accountable for deviations from the annual plan and budget, since they were the contracting partner who received the funding. This organizational structure caused frictions between DADTCO and IFDC as the latter was accountable for actions it could not control (De Jager, 2015: personal interview).

The Ministry has a rather passive role in this partnership, as it argued that there should be a divide between the actor controlling the annual plan and budget and the one who executes it. It did however attempt to bring the parties together again, and thus got shifted into the role of mediator (Calon, 2015: personal interview). Therefore, in 2011 it conducted a mid-term review. One of the main conclusions was that the partnership lacked a “joint-management and decision making structure” (Helping Farmers, 2013: 46). In order to solve this issue the review proposed to assign the management of the project to a joint DADTCO IFDC Management Team steered by representatives of both partners. At the local executive level the Management Team would exist of one representative of each partner, as well as a representative of the local government, who met on a weekly basis and prepared monthly working plans. Moreover, the review also proposed the creation of a steering committee led by the Dutch embassy, in which all the stakeholders would get a voice. Unfortunately, these recommendations were not put into practise as the partnership in Nigeria dissolved before its end date, neither have they been implemented in Ghana or Mozambique (International Fertilizer Development, 2013: 46).

Legitimacy of the partnership

This partnership scores average concerning its representativeness and inclusion. The PPP consist of one public, one private and one civic actor, and on an irregular basis involves the local government, industry and knowledge institutions. However, not all these actors are equally included in the decision-making process. Although the partnership includes the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it has a passive role, abstaining from participating in the day-to-day decision-making process. Moreover, DADTCO and IFDC write the annual plan and draft the budget, which means that the Ministry is also only limitedly involved in the long-term decision-making process. Also the other actors do not have a say regarding the daily decisions. Consequently, the partnership's inclusion mainly exist of one private and one civic actor, both from the developing world. It could be argued, however, that the role of SABMiller in the projects in Mozambique and Ghana has been more prominent, as the company provides the market for the cassava. Since the demand is the primary driving factor in the decision-making process, SABMiller could actually play a significant role, however indirectly and not formally represented in the partnership.

Transparency and deliberation between the partners was also limited, as a result of communication issues. It should be noted, however, that there is a significant difference between the projects in Nigeria and Ghana on the one hand and Mozambique on the other, as the project in Mozambique is growing and the collaboration between the partners appears robust (Van Melick, 2015: personal interview). In Nigeria and Ghana, however, the communication between the partners was insufficient. As mentioned before, DADTCO decided where it would station its AMPUs and based on that information IFDC trained the farmers living in that area. However, there was no deliberation between DADTCO and IFDC with regard to the stationing of these processing units. Both partners worked their part of the project, either downstream or upstream, but the communication to combine the two sections effectively was lacking. The transparency about one another's short-term plans was not communicated adequately. IFDC perceived the DADTCO management to operate

on an ad hoc basis, while DADTCO reproached IFDC to be inflexible and not sufficiently market-oriented (De Jager, 2015: personal interview).

These deficiencies also hindered the partnership's goal rationality and rendered it less effective. The project's goals are clearly outlined, as mentioned above, however the means to achieve these goals have not been implemented effectively in Nigeria and Ghana. As a result of deficiencies in the planning and communication between the partners, it has occurred several times that the AMPUs were not placed where they were expected to be, leaving the farmers without a market for their produce. As a result of these malfunctions the means could not be used to their full potential. Consequently, the partnership has not been as effective as was hoped. Before the start of the partnership the project was expected to involve approximately 12,000 small-holder farmer families, together producing 720,000 metric tons of cassava by the third project year in Nigeria, after which it would be expanded to Togo and Benin (International Fertilizer Development, 2013:38-39). Unfortunately, this expansion did not take place as only 1.195 farmers were incorporated by the third year supplying 4.457 metric tons of cassava roots to the AMPUs (International Fertilizer Development, 2013:6). It should be noted, however, that the initial plan was too ambitious as it takes time to transform a subsistence crop into an industrial value chain (Calon, 2015:personal interview). Again, the difference between Nigeria and Ghana on the one hand, and the collaboration in Mozambique on the other hand should also be mentioned, as the project in Mozambique currently includes 4.600 farmers and continues to grow (Sopov et al, 2014:71).

Food security, unfortunately, did not improve as much as expected, as DADTCO had difficulties securing a market for the produce, because of the strong lobbying activities in favour of the imported wheat flour and the closing of the largest purchaser of the cakes. Moreover, because farmers are not sufficiently business-oriented and DADTCO does not set a threshold for the harvesting of cassava, the farmers tend to sell their cassava when the household needs are highest, instead of when yield would be optimal. Therefore, the farmer might gain less from its produce than possible. This could result in food insecurity in later stages. It should be noted,

however, that the farmers did benefit from the agricultural training and the improved varieties received from IFDC, because they were able to improve their yields significantly and therefore had more food to consume (De Jager, 2015: personal interview). Also the local market for cassava expanded, as a result of these developments, therefore mitigating the effects of low demands for cassava cake.

3.1.3. Smarter Futures – Improving quality wheat and maize flour in Africa

Background

The Smarter Futures partnership got established in 2008 between four partners from various backgrounds with the financial support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Food Fortification Initiative (formerly the Flour Fortification Initiative) is the initiator of the partnership and is seen as the umbrella partner to which all the other partners, except Hellen Keller International, are a member (Verster, 2015: personal interview). This organisation aims at promoting fortification of grains by cooperating in multi-stakeholder partnerships. The private actor partner, AkzoNobel is an international paintings and coating company and world leader in the production of iron EDTA, the iron compound which is used to fortify whole wheat flours. The third partner, the International Federation of Spina Bifida and Hydrocephalus (IF), is a civil society organisation which combines the efforts of 44 national and regional spina bifida and hydrocephalus organisations in 41 countries. It aspires to reduce the incidence of spina bifida and hydrocephalus and to improve the quality of life for people living with these disabilities. The third civil society partner, Helen Keller International (HKI), is a worldwide NGO dedicated to combating the consequences and causes of blindness, loss of sight and malnutrition. It does so through local and regional programmes in Asia and Africa where it provides education on nutrition and assists countries in putting in place food fortification programmes (Smarter Futures, 2011:6-7).

All the partners are involved in food fortification, albeit in their particular area of expertise. IF is primarily concerned with fortification of wheat products by adding folic acid. Adding this vitamin to food will lead to a decrease of birth defects, such as spina

bifida. Hellen Keller International, on the other hand, started off by mainly fortifying with vitamin A, as it decreases the incidences of blindness, but has since moved to the full scale of fortification of flour and cooking oils. The partnership with AkzoNobel is especially useful for Smarter Futures, as AkzoNobel was the first to produce food-grade iron EDTA to be used in food products. FFI, as the umbrella organisation, does not specify in one particular vitamin, but instead promotes fortification in general. Through FFI's network the partners became acquainted with one another's work and decided to collaborate, as they recognized that there was a lack of advocacy about food fortification and quality control on fortification programmes, especially in Africa. HKI only joined the partnership several months after its initiation (Bauwens, 2015: personal interview; Verster, 2015: personal interview).

Approximately one third of people in Sub-Saharan Africa do not have sufficient vitamin and mineral intake, "impacting physical and cognitive development and disability among populations, as well as the economic prospects of nations" (Smarter Futures, 2011:16). Food fortification plays a key role in preventing the negative consequences of food insecurity and its effects on a country's economy. According to the 'Global Progress Report on Vitamin and Mineral Deficiencies' drafted by UNICEF and the Micronutrient Initiative, vitamin and mineral deficiencies result in a loss of GDP between 1% and 2.5% on average (Adamson, 2004:37). Fortifying staple foods such as rice, maize, wheat and cassava with micronutrients such as folic acid, zinc, iron and other B-vitamins is a relatively simple method of combating malnutrition, without requiring people to change their diet.

Moreover, it is very cost-effective. On average, in Africa, the benefit for cost ratio of fortifying food is 8/10:1, indicating that for every dollar invested in food fortification the economic gain will be eight- to tenfold (Smarter Futures, 2011:11). In recent years food fortification has increasingly gained attention. International organisations such as WFP and FAO are no longer primarily focussing on the quantity of food. Instead, the quality of food gained importance as well, leaving room for a growing attention on food fortification. Unfortunately, at the beginning of the century, only few countries in Africa already fortified food. Smarter Futures got created in order to help countries embark on effective fortification (Verster, 2015: personal interview).

In 2009 the first project term was initiated with a relatively small budget, compared to the other case studies, of €838.500,- of which 38% (€319.00,-) was derived from the Schokland Fund (Van Gerwen and Van Ede, 2014:168). Despite this small budget, Smarter Futures does not specify to a particular target area. Instead, it aims at making food fortification legally binding in every African country. It does so through training and advocacy. During the first project period (2009-2011) twelve countries achieved the goal of nationwide flour fortification. As a consequence, the project got extended until December 2017 and got renamed 'Upscaling Smarter Futures' (Smarter Futures, 2014:2). For this second term the budget got extended significantly to €3.750.000,- of which 40% (€1.500.000,-) is provided by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Smarter Futures, 2014:2). The remaining 60% is provided for in cash or in-kind by the other partners.

Partners' goals and motives

Smarter Futures aims to make fortification of wheat and flour legally binding in each African country. It is a public-private-civic network that attempts to bring the stakeholders together on a national and regional level and provide them with technical assistance and training, for example to millers, but also it aims to influence government regulation and standards' harmonisation to enable fortification, (Verster, 2015: personal interview). It primarily targets children, adolescents and women of child-bearing age, as these groups are most vulnerable to the consequences of vitamin and mineral deficiencies (Smarter Futures, 2011: 17). In order to achieve the overall goal of food fortification in Africa, the partnership established several short-term goals during the upscaling of the project in 2011. The following, more specific, goals are expected to be met by the end of the second project term (2012-2017):

- “By end of 2017, most countries in Africa will have a National Fortification Alliance, a functioning public-private partnership that will make sure that all wheat flour and products (bread, *chapatti*) in their country are fortified with essential vitamins and minerals.

- By end of 2017, in 7 new countries over 75% of all industrial wheat flour produced will be adequately fortified, i.e. Gambia, Mauritania, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Lesotho, Rwanda.
- By end of 2017, 15 additional countries are expected to have started fortifying their wheat flour with iron and folic acid, and possibly zinc and vitamin B-12, based on scientifically sound and technically feasible standards and with mandatory regulations for both in-country production and imports. These are: Botswana, Namibia, Congo, Madagascar, Niger, Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Mauritius, Kenya, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Burundi” (Smarter Futures, 2014:2).

Smarter Futures, together with FFI, has developed several advocacy and technical tools to be used by their African partners in order to work towards achieving these goals. They have developed an Advocacy Toolkit for Fortifying with Folic Acid, providing stakeholders with all the necessary information about fortification with folic acid, its benefits, and the consequences of folic acid deficiencies. Also, a Millers Toolkit has been developed, because millers are the executors of the fortification process. This toolkit includes information on how to successfully fortify wheat and maize, as well as technical and commercial advice. In addition to this toolkit, Smarter Futures and FFI have created a Monitor for Quality and Impact, in order to assess the quality of the fortified flour and its impact on the target group. This toolkit is especially developed for millers and government authorities, such as food safety agencies, to allow them to track the programme’s impact (Smarter Futures, 2011:11).

A Cost-Benefit Analysis Tool has also been developed in order to monitor the economic costs of not fortifying and compare it with the benefits of the fortification project on a country-level. It is a useful measure in order to gain stakeholder’s confidence on the (economic) importance of fortification (Food Fortification Initiative, 2015). Finally, a method of auditing the impact of the flour fortification programmes has been developed as an extension of the Monitor for Quality and Impact, named FORTIMAS (Fortification Monitoring and Surveillance). This programme answers the

question: “is the micronutrient status of those who regularly consume sufficient quality fortified flour improving?” (Smarter Futures, 2015). FORTIMAS enables countries that implemented a food fortification programme to view trends and therefore assess the impact of the programme, without having to conduct expensive and time-consuming surveys. These can still be conducted in later stages, after the project has been implemented for several years. In the meantime, FORTIMAS allows for short-term impact assessment. Through training and advocacy people are educated on the usages of each of these tools (Verster, 2015: personal interview).

As mentioned before, the partners decided to combine efforts in this partnership because they all aim to increase the intake of fortified food in Africa, and acknowledged the need for more advocacy and training concerning this topic. FFI initiated this partnership as the African branch to its existing network, because Africa was the continent with the lowest amount of fortified food being consumed. This new partnership would therefore focus its attention solely on Africa. The International Federation for Spina Bifida and Hydrocephalus became involved in the partnership, because of the potential it offered to expand its reach. The organisation already had been active in fortifying flour with folic acid for several years, however, fortification usually involves adding several vitamins and minerals jointly. Therefore, collaborating with other organisations also involved in food fortification, using different vitamins and minerals, expands the possibilities for IF. Moreover, because birth deficiencies such as spina bifida cannot be cured, but only prevented, it is important to increase the coverage, as food fortification is the most effective method to increase people’s vitamin and mineral intake. HKI joined the partnership with similar motives, as the organisation aims at preventing blindness through fortification with vitamin A (Bauwens, 2015: personal interview).

Vice versa, AkzoNobel became involved, because the company could enlarge its market through Smarter Futures, as the national Food Fortification Alliances and other stakeholders might want to fortify using their iron EDTA. However, it should be noted that AkzoNobel also acts out of corporate social responsibility, as the food industry is

not within its core business in any manner (Bauwens, 2015: personal interview). Finally, the Ministry got involved in the partnership, because the project is one of the few aiming at prevention. Under the Schokland Pact, there are several other projects concerned with food security, however, all aim at fighting the problem, instead of preventing it. Therefore, this project offered an interesting variation to the other projects funded by the Dutch government (Leeflang, 2015: personal interview).

Organisational set up

Smarter Futures can be regarded as the ‘African branch’ of the Food Fortification Initiative. It uses the FFI network and promotes and strengthens the activities of FFI’s partners, among others, the World Health Organization (WHO), the Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition (GAIN), UNICEF, and the World Bank. This partnership functions differently from the other two case studies. Instead of actively being involved in the production processes, Smarter Futures is a network of partners, each with their own activities, aiming at advocacy and training in distinct regions in Africa. (Smarter Futures, 2014:2). Therefore, the partnership does not create organisations itself, nor does it “invest large programme resources at country level” (Flour Fortification, 2011:10). Instead, it supports the creation of local and national public-private partnerships at the promotion of fortification. In many countries these partnerships are called ‘National Fortification Alliances’ existing of flour millers, governments, international organisations and mineral suppliers (Bauwens, 2015: personal interview).

Each partner committed to the partnership by means of signing a letter of intent, in which it outlined the contributions it would provide to the partnership, as well as its roles and responsibilities (Verster, 2015: personal interview). Because of this organisational arrangement, only IF has a formal contract with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as they are the ones to receive the funding from the Dutch government. These financial means are used to execute the project on a regional and country-level, i.e. providing training and workshops. Besides managing the public fund, IF also contributes with its own means to the partnership. It takes responsibility for the website, for example, and the publication of the monitoring tools.

HKI is primarily focussed on West-Africa, which resulted in them coordinating Smarter Futures' activities in that region. They mainly contribute in-kind, for example through providing workshops (Bauwens, 2015: personal interview; Verster, 2015: personal interview). AkzoNobel, is the largest cash donor together with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Besides this contribution, they also provide technical expertise on the usage of iron EDTA in fortification processes. The Ministry has a rather passive role in the partnership. They function primarily as the financier and controller of the annual plan and budget. The argument under the original Schokland Agreement was that the actor financing and controlling the project should not be involved in its execution (Leeftang, 2015: personal interview).

As mentioned earlier, Smarter Futures is a network in which the partners combine efforts, but remain active in their own areas. Therefore, the partners do not always perform in name of Smarter Futures. Instead, each partner has its own activities, which are mostly executed using their own name. However, when one of these activities is related to fortification the partners will operate in name of Smarter Futures (Bauwens, 2015: personal interview). For example, IF is also active in other domains, such as human rights and international solidarity. Activities in Africa concerning these domains will be executed in name of IF, however, when the events are related to food fortification Smarter Futures' brand will be used (Bauwens, 2015: personal interview). This year, a training on neural tube defects will be given in Zambia, where the partners will work together in name of Smarter Futures. Stakeholders from other countries in the region will be invited to partake in order to increase the coverage. Besides educating the participants on the issue at stake Smarter Futures also attempts to bring together stakeholders in order to establish new partnerships, such as the National Fortification Alliances, or deepen and expand already existing ones (Verster, 2015: personal interview).

In order to coordinate these activities a steering committee was set up, existing of a representative of each of the partners, except for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

This committee decides on the annual plan and budget, including the activities that will take place in the up-coming year and the priority countries where they will take place (Leeftang, 2015: personal interview). These countries are selected on the basis of an empirical assessment conducted by FFI in order to map those countries that need extra attention concerning food fortification, for example Ethiopia (Verster, 2015: personal interview). The steering committee meets twice a year, often once physical and once using Skype. It is difficult to assemble all the partners, because they are located in different parts of the world. During these meetings the annual report and the annual plan are drafted (Bauwens, 2015: personal interview; Verster 2015: personal interview). Besides, the partners also divide the tasks and responsibilities. Who is initiating and coordinating which workshop, for example. In executing these activities cooperation is sought with local governments, millers and local NGOs, all from the developing countries. Smarter Futures also cooperates with other industrial actors from the developed world, such as DSM, Mühlenchemie and BASF as they supply the partners with premixes used for fortification.

Legitimacy of the partnership

Assessing this partnership's representativeness asks for a different approach compared to the other two case studies. This partnership largely exists of NGO's, one private actor AkzoNobel, and one public actor, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. All are based in developed countries, although HKI participates in Smarter Futures through its regional offices in Dakar and Senegal, and FFI has an Africa Network Coordinator working from Uganda. Therefore, it could be argued that the partnership itself scores average on representativeness. However, because of its nature as a network, Smarter Futures does also represent actors in the developing world, such as millers, national governments, and local NGOs, mainly through the creation of, and support for, the National Fortification Alliances. Also through the use of the FFI network, other organisations and companies from developed countries are involved, such as UNICEF, GAIN and DSM. It should be noted, however, that these partners officially do not form

part of the original partnership. Neither do they take part in the decision-making process. Decisions regarding the partnerships policy are made by the steering committee.

This committee includes all the partners, except for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Although the project proposal states that “the Dutch government is welcome to join this group”, it does not take part in the decision-making process, because it prefers to refrain itself from influencing financial decisions, due to its function as the financier (Smarter Futures, 2011:7). However, as the controller of the annual plan and budget the Ministry could have a steering role, because it has the power to deny particular plans or advise on adjustments (Leeflang, 2015: personal interview). Each of the partners is therefore held responsible by the Ministry. However, as the contractor with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, IF plays an important role here as well. Because IF manages the budget and financial reports all the other partners have to justify their expenses to IF, who in turn sends the financial report to the Ministry for control. Because of this set up, the partnership scores low on inclusiveness as only one private actor and three NGOs from the developed region are involved. Although the PPP affects African policies, the stakeholders are not included in the decision-making process.


Contrary to the two indicators above, the partnership does score well on transparency. All the partners have access to the annual reports, forward plans and budget. These are also made public on the website, for other partners and stakeholders to read. Moreover, partners keep one another updated on their individual plans and activities and seek cooperation when required. As with inclusiveness, the Ministry does not form part of this exchange of information. It is not deliberately excluded, however, but preferred to take up a passive role in the partnership. It has access however to the annual reports, forward plans and budget (Leeflang, 2015: personal interview).

The Ministry does not take part in the bi-annual meetings either. Since this PPP is relatively small and not active on a daily basis, because each of the partners have their own activities as well, deliberation between the partners occurs regularly, but not often. This also depends on the agenda, i.e. whether there is an event planned for example. However, the partners do discuss all relevant issues and each has an equal share in the

discussion. It should be noted nonetheless, that deliberation with AkzoNobel has been more turbulent, because food fortification does not form part of the company's core business. AkzoNobel's commitment has therefore been highly dependent on the efforts of a small group of people. Due to restructuring of the internal organisation, communication and deliberation with the private actor have been hindered somewhat (Bauwens, 2015: personal interview).

The partnership scores well on goal rationality, but assessing its effectiveness is a critical point. Although the PPP has clearly indicated its goals, both short- and long-term, and it is actively working towards achieving these goals, the PPP cannot take responsibility for implementing flour fortification in African countries. Smarter Futures itself does not implement food fortification programmes, but supports those who do. Therefore, assessing the partnership's effectiveness is difficult. Since the start of the partnership in 2009 there has been a significant increase in countries that are fortifying flour, as can be seen in the maps below.

Figure 3.1: Status of fortification in Africa in respectively 2008, 2011 and 2014
(Adapted from Smarter Futures, 2014:5)



Despite these improvements it is difficult to assess the actual impact of the partnership, since it is impossible to measure the influence and result of the training and technical assistance that it provides. It is only possible to measure its input, output and outcome (Verster, 2015: personal interview). Input involves the events organised by the partnership, the training and workshops given. Output concerns the amount of people being trained to effectively implement a fortification programme or quality control, for example. Since the start of the project in 2009 Smarter Futures has provided training on fortification and quality control to stakeholders from 28 countries (Smarter Futures, 2014:4). The outcome is related to the amount of millers that are now fortifying their produce correctly, the number of NFA's that have been created and made aware on the issue at hand and the tools that have been developed. However, Smarter Futures cannot claim sole responsibility for the impact of the project and the work of the Fortification Alliances. It can only say it has contributed to the increase in fortification. At present, 28 African countries actively fortify flour (Verster, 2015: personal interview).

Because Smarter Futures cannot claim direct impact, it is difficult to assess its effectiveness on improving food security. The partnership can only claim indirect impact. According to Scott Montgomery, FFI Director, “the health benefits of food made with fortified flour are probably reaching somewhere between an additional 15 million and 82 million people in 2013 compared to 2011” (Food Fortification Initiative, 2015). These are very broad estimates, varying even more between the African regions, as well as between the rural and urban areas. Bread and other flour products are primarily consumed in urban areas, resulting in higher access to fortified flour than in rural regions (Food Fortification Initiative, 2015). In West-Africa, where most progress has been made, 90% of the overall population consumes fortified flour (Food Fortification Initiative, 2015). And on average, the prevalence of neural tube defects (NTDs), such as spina bifida, decreases with 46% when the population has access to fortified flour (Smarter Futures, 2014b; 5). Unfortunately, it remains difficult to determine the percentage of wheat flour consumption as part of the total food

consumption, making it problematic to report on the actual average intake per person of fortified flour in Africa.

3.2 Concluding remarks

Based on the three PPPs described in the case studies it is possible to draw conclusions on their legitimacy as actors to improve food security in Africa. All three cases score well on representation (score = 4). Because of the nature of the projects, partners from both the public and private sector as well as civil society have been represented in each of the partnerships. However, representation of the target group and local governments in the developing countries varies between the partners and remains rather difficult. In order to create broad public support for the project it is necessary, however to incorporate these stakeholders. The same accounts for inclusion (score = 3/4). Again, a public, private and civil society actor take part in the decision-making process, but these are primarily from the developed world. The stakeholders from the developing world are often not included. In two of the three partnerships the Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintained a passive role and was reluctant to get actively involved in the decision-making process, as it preferred to separate the roles of financier/controller and executor. However, as became clear in the partnership between EUCORD and Heineken, both partners appreciated an active involvement from the Ministry and the project even benefitted from this position, because the Ministry brought in particular knowledge concerning development, as well as its local network of government representatives.

All three partnerships also score very well on transparency (score = 5) and, despite some variation between the partnerships, deliberation also occurs frequently between the partners and concerning all relevant issues (score = 3/4). Because the partnerships exist of only a few partners, it is relatively easy to deliberate with one another. But also due to the necessity to cooperate in order for the partnership to be successful the partners are transparent about their activities and communicate on a regular basis. As the Cassava+ project indicated, it is necessary for the partners to deliberate frequently and take important decisions jointly. In this partnership

DADTCO is in the lead as it decides where and when it will place its AMPUs. IFDC has to adapt to these decisions. This can cause frictions when the communication is insufficient and the partners are not transparent about their activities, especially when the roles and responsibilities are not adequately formulated. Therefore, in order for the partners to deliberate effectively and the partnership to be successful, it is important to have the roles and responsibilities clearly indicated.

Goal rationality is also an important aspect of a successful partnership. All three cases have clearly outlined their goals and are actively working towards achieving these (score = 4/5). Again, it is significant for the partners to find common ground in their goals and motives before the start of the project, so they will all work in unison in order to achieve this objective. In order for the partners to find this common ground it is helpful to work in the private actor's core-business. This will make the company enthusiastic and willing to invest, as is the case with DADTCO and Heineken.

AkzoNobel, on the other hand, is less involved in the partnership, because the project is concerned with a smaller and more insignificant aspect of the company. Moreover, it is also necessary for the private company to be able to take a long-term perspective, since these projects are long-term commitments. An issue in the Cassava+ project was the fact that DADTCO was not able to uphold its commitment during economically difficult times. This affected the relationship with IFDC, but also hampered the projects effectiveness. Heineken, in contrast, a large and vested company, is better able to make long-term commitments, also because the Heineken family still owns a little over the majority shares of the company. The short-term goals of being profitable and satisfying the shareholders is important, but the company is able to take a long-term perspective, which is required for development projects like these.

Finally, the partnerships have been effective in varying ways (score = 3/4), depending on the region of engagement, the organisational set up and external factors. For a PPP to be effective the five indicators discussed above need to be covered. As indicated by the Cassava+ partnership, when the roles and responsibilities are not clearly formulated from the onset and there is a lack of transparency, deliberation and inclusion, the partnership will not be effective. However, as indicated by the same

Cassava+ project in Mozambique, when the partners actively work to improve these aspects it is possible to positively alter its course and effectively work towards achieving these goals. Although all three cases have been effective overall, it remains difficult to examine the effectiveness of the partnerships in improving food security. This is especially the case regarding the Smarter Futures partnership. Because of its nature as a network it cannot claim direct impact. The partnership provides an infrastructure for stakeholders to be able to effectively implement flour fortification programmes in order to improve the regional or national micronutrient situation. However, the number of countries fortifying flour has increased significantly since the start of the project from merely 9 in 2008 to 28 at this moment (Smarter Futures, 2015). Both the Cassava+ project in Mozambique and the partnership between Heineken and EUCORD have been able to establish sustainable value chains, which increases the farmer's food production and income, leaving them more food secure. Nonetheless, it should be pointed out that, first, it is difficult to actually measure an improvement in food security and second, not always are crops being cultivated that are used as food crops, rendering the improvements lower than expected.

4 Conclusion

This thesis examined the traditional ODA system providing food assistance and compared it with Public-Private Partnerships aiming to improve food security in fragile states in Africa, on the basis of their legitimacy. In operationalizing the concept of legitimacy by examining the representativeness, inclusion, transparency, deliberation, goal rationality and effectiveness, it was possible to adequately assess both systems.

For both the traditional ODA system and Public-Private Partnerships representation of all the stakeholders involved does not appear to be an issue. However, PPPs are able to represent more stakeholders as they include the private sector. Unfortunately, both systems lack full inclusion of stakeholders from the developing world in the decision-making processes. Often NGOs and local governments from the developing world have less input in the decision-making process than actors from the developed world. In the traditional ODA system this is due to a skewed power relation. In the PPPs this is primarily because the decisions are being made at the managerial level between the initiators of the project originating from developed countries. However, actors from the developing world are regularly included in the daily decision-making process on the executive level, depending on the partnership. Therefore, it can be concluded that Public-Private Partnerships are able to aid in filling the participation deficit, including almost all the stakeholders in the partnership and its decision-making process. However, the level of participation varies between the partnerships.

In contrast to the equality of PPPs and ODA with regards to representativeness and inclusions, there is a significant difference with regard to the transparency of both systems. As pointed out, transparency appears to be a critical point for the traditional ODA system, because of the high level of fragmentation in the system and the lack of openness about internal discussions. Due to an increasing public demand for more transparency, however, many organisations are now attempting to improve in this point. Nonetheless, there still remains significant room for improvement. Public-Private Partnerships on the other hand, are examined to be transparent in

communicating their internal affairs, both within the organisation as well as towards third parties and other stakeholders. This is partly a result of the limited number of partners, which facilitates deliberation between the stakeholders. Consequently, Public-Private Partnerships also score rather well on deliberation. In general, communication between the partners occurs frequently, as most partners acknowledge its necessity in order for the partnership to be successful. Deliberation in the ODA system is difficult to examine as there is little known about the communication between the members of the multilateral organisations, such as WFP and FAO. However, as written in the statutes, the boards and other executive organs of these organisations are required to meet on a regular basis. Moreover, there is an increasing focus on deliberation between these institutions in order to coordinate their efforts.

Goal rationality is a clear point of appraisal for both systems, as the goals are clearly indicated and the actors in the systems are actively using the available means to achieve these objectives. Unfortunately, these means are not always used effectively. Effectiveness remains a highly criticised issue for the traditional ODA system, especially in (Sub-Saharan) Africa. Despite numerous efforts to improve the effectiveness of the food assistance to the continent, its food security status remains behind on other developing regions. But also within Africa there are significant differences in the development of food security. Although the situation has improved since 1990, progress has been slow and skewed. Public-Private Partnerships, on the other hand, have been effective, albeit small-scale, in improving food security in Africa. All three projects have resulted in larger quantities and better quality of food available. Moreover, the PPPs have also increased, either direct or indirect, farmer families disposable income, allowing them to purchase more food and/or other necessities. It should be noted, nonetheless, that these improvements are still moderate, because the projects are all relatively young – 6 or 7 years at most – especially compared to the life cycle of ODA. Consequently, Public-Private Partnerships could aid to fill the implementation gap, albeit on a small-scale.

However, in order for PPPs to be effective, there are several conditions which ought to be met. First, the roles and responsibilities between the partners need to be

clearly formulated and there needs to be common ground on the goals to be achieved. This will also be facilitated when the project takes place within the private actor's core business, increasing its active cooperation and willingness to invest. Deliberation and the ultimate effectiveness of the partnership will be thwarted if these are not adequately defined at the start of the project. Second, the partners need to be in close contact with one another. Decisions need to be made through deliberation. Moreover, it is important to incorporate the local stakeholders in this process, in order to gain public support for the project, but also to increase its effectiveness, because these stakeholders provide in depth knowledge about the local situation. Finally, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should take up an active role in the partnership, instead of merely remaining the financier, because it adds to the equation its experience in development as well as its network. Moreover, as a rather neutral partner it could balance the relation between the private actor and the civil society organisation.

In conclusion, are Public-Private Partnerships legitimate tools of global governance to improve food assistance in fragile states compared to Official Development Assistance? PPPs, as multi-sectorial, transnational partnerships are well-equipped to improve food security as an addition to Official Development Assistance, provided that the above mentioned conditions are met. If this is the case, PPPs enable rural communities to improve their long-term availability, accessibility and stability of food. However, there are several points of critique related to the selectivity and capacity of Public-Private Partnerships that hinder their potential as actors to improve food security in fragile states.

First, although the theory argues that PPPs step in where governments fail, the case studies have pointed out that the partnerships deliberately choose not to become active in fragile situations, because these pose too high investment risks. All interviewees argued that a certain level of stability is required in order to develop the projects. Despite not actively becoming engaged in fragile states, the partnership between Heineken and EUCORD, however, does not withdraw the project when a situation turns fragile. This is partly because of social development reasons, but also because Heineken has a very stable bargaining position in most countries, as it often is

the largest tax payer. Overall, however, Public-Private Partnerships cannot fill the governance deficit and substitute the government when its capacity and competence are lacking.

Second, PPPs mostly function on a small-scale. Because the partnerships exist only of few partners, whose capacity will be limited compared to international organisations such as WFP and FAO, they are only able to reach a relatively small part of the African population. Although, multinational companies such as Heineken have a large coverage, the reach of the partnership remains limited as extensive resources and time are required in order to extend the projects. Smarter Futures is the only partnership of the three that employs a large scale approach, focussing on the entire African continent. The other two partnerships focus on specific, local areas within countries. Scaling-up these partnerships raises the question who is to initiate and manage the projects in other areas? Should the private sector duplicate the partnership in all other regions where it is active or should the national governments take the upper hand, for example? Moreover, also within the countries particular areas of engagement are selected, bearing in mind the potential for successful implementation of the project. Certain levels of infrastructure, political and economic stability are required. Consequently, the partnerships do not necessarily target the most food insecure populations. Further research should examine the spin-off effect of the projects to other areas and populations. ODA, in contrast, has a much larger coverage and lacks this selectivity, therefore reaching a broader population. It should be noted however, that, as a result of ODA's large scale focus, the assistance is also less targeted, which could render it less effective.

As a result of these critiques, PPPs can form an important addition to the ODA system. By their nature, Public Private Partnerships, combine the strengths of their independent partners, while keeping each other in check. In the words of Paul Stanger, local sourcing director for Heineken in Africa and the Middle East: "PPPs keep us honest" (Stanger, 2015: personal interview). PPPs are transparent and inclusive instruments of global governance, able to effectively improve food security on a small-scale. However, ODA remains an important provider of food assistance in order to

improve large-scale food security for the most food insecure populations and those in fragile situations.

These conclusions are primarily based on information obtained through interviews with the partners involved in the PPPs, which could steer the outcome more positively towards the PPPs. Moreover, because of practical reasons, only three case studies could be examined, rendering the conclusions less strong. These three cases have been selected on the basis of their diversity, in order to obtain a broad view of PPPs as instruments to improve food security. However, this broad approach, made it difficult to draw strong conclusions. Further research should therefore examine a larger number of cases, using an observer approach to collecting the data.

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Appendices

Appendix A: List of possible interviewees

Partnership	Name	Function	Organisation
Increase food security and improve livelihoods of sorghum and rice producers.	Paul Stanger	Local Sourcing Director Africa and the Middle East	Heineken International B.V.
	Henk Knipscheer	Senior advisor	European Cooperative for Rural Development
	Jurriaan Middelhof	Policy officer	Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Smarter futures – improving quality wheat and maize flour in Africa	Mario Leeftang	Senior policy advisor	Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs
	Anna Verster	Project manager	Smarter Futures
	Lieven Bauwens	Secretary General	International Federation for Spina Bifida and Hydrocephalus
Helping Farmers produce cassava for profit	Andre de Jager	Director North and West Africa Division	International Fertilizer Development Center
	Monique Calon	Senior policy advisor	Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs
	Hubert van Melick	Managing Director Mozambique	Dutch Agricultural Development and Trading Company

Appendix B: Interview questions

Background questions

1. What were the motives for Partner X to set up this Public-Private Partnership?
2. What were the criteria on which the partners were selected?
3. What were the criteria on which the countries/areas of engagement were chosen?
 - a. Did the lack of a strong state influence your decision to engage in that particular country?
 - b. If so, in what way did it influence this decision?
4. How have you experienced the performance of the PPP in the selected countries so far?
5. How is the project perceived locally in the areas of engagement?
 - a. What is the perception of the local community?
 - b. What is the perception of the local government/authority?
6. Where there any differences in implementation and outcome of the projects in the distinct countries of engagement?
 - a. How could you explain these differences?

Legitimacy assessment questions

7. How does the PPP function internally?
 - a. Please explain the organisational structure of the PPP.
 - i. Is there formal or informal hierarchy among the partners?
 - ii. Is there an executive board working on behalf of the partners?
 - iii. Could you explain in what way the partners are being held accountable? Are they equally responsible for each other's actions?
 - b. Do all the partners have an equal say in the decision-making process?
 - c. How often do the partners meet to discuss the development of the partnership?
 - d. Do all partners have access to the same information regarding the state of affairs of the partnership?
 - e. Did the performance of the PPP affect the policy formulation in later stages of the partnership?
 - i. If so, in what way?
8. Please describe the partnerships main goals.
 - a. Please outline the short-term as well as the long-term goals.
 - b. How is the partnership working to achieve these?
 - i. Does the partnership have clear regulation and programmes in order to implement its policy and to achieve its goals?

- ii. Do all the partners comply to this policy?
 - iii. Could you please describe the activities that are set up in order to achieve these goals?
 - c. Which of these policy areas need improvement?
- 9. Could you please elaborate on the main results that have been achieved so far?
 - a. Did the partnership develop as initially expected?
 - b. Are there any unforeseen positive or negative side effects that resulted from this partnership?
- 10. What are the most important lessons you have learned from this Partnership?
 - a. Concerning the project as well as the organisation and cooperation of the Partnership, is there anything you would do differently next time?